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FOREWORD
This September, President Xi Jinping announced an am-
bitious, first-ever post-2030 climate target: that China 
will strive to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. 
The announcement is hugely significant—perhaps the 
biggest positive climate development globally since the 
2015 Paris Agreement. However, achieving the carbon 
neutrality target will be immensely challenging. 
Energy Foundation China (EF China) is a non-profit 
charitable organization that has been working in China 
since 1999. We are committed to promoting prosperity, 
sustainable development, and climate security for China 
and the world. Three years ago, EF China launched our 
first and highest priority flagship initiative—the Long-
Term Strategy for Decarbonization Task Force (LTS). Over 
the past three years, we have steadily built capacity 
and strategically supported research to make the case 
for a new, low-carbon growth model toward sustainable 
prosperity and carbon neutrality. In June 2019, we 
finalized our LTS strategy, including overall goals to 
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and climate neutrality 
by 2070. That same week, at the annual meeting of the 
China Council for International Cooperation on Environ-
ment and Development in Hangzhou, we first presented 
this vision for China’s long-term climate targets to senior 
Chinese policymakers. For over a year, we have steadily 
engaged climate and energy experts, as well as those in 
economics and development, to make the case for the 
feasibility and opportunity of net zero. 
In support of our vision for a carbon neutral China, EF 
China has invested considerable efforts both domestically 
and internationally. Early on, our LTS Task Force initiated 
a joint research project with Institute of Climate Change 
and Sustainable Development (ICCSD) at Tsinghua 
University on China’s long-term low carbon development 
strategy and pathways, engaging 24 top think tanks in 
China. In parallel, to introduce international perspec-
tives, EF China engaged the several international leading 
think tanks including International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, University of Maryland, Joint Research 
Centre (European Commission), and other experts to 
advise on China’s Mid-Century Strategy, and cooperated 
with the International Energy Agency, Potsdam Institute 
for Climate Impact Research, 2050 Pathway Platform, 
and E3G in LTS modelling and technical discussions. 
Through these wide-ranging partnerships, EF China culti-
vated a network of international and domestic modelers, 
powered the exchange of knowledge in the climate and 
energy research field, and created a multilateral open 
intellectual platform for cooperation. Meanwhile, to 
popularize the notion of carbon neutrality, EF China orga-
nized international advisory roundtables and Economists 
Dialogues to showcase solid evidence for decarbonizing. 
Finally, EF China has been facilitating decarbonization 
pilot programs at sectoral and local levels to demonstrate 
and catalyze real changes on the ground.
Today, we are excited to release our first synthesis report 
based on multi-model comparison research and other 
knowledge sources—a major milestone for the LTS Task 
Force. The report features comprehensive views from 
prestigious research teams in China and abroad and 
helps fulfill EF China’s role as a strategic advisor, facili-
tator and regrantor leveraging comprehensive insights to 
inform policymakers. 
The report sets out the broad outlines of decarboniza-
tion, identifies key elements of strategy across the econ-
omy and within individual economic sectors, and points 
toward continued research needs to support China’s 
success in meeting its 2060 pledge and long-term goals 
for growth and development. The publication of this 
synthesis report may contribute to build the narrative 
of 14th Five-Year Plan, would not be possible without 
China’s growing willingness to lead and cooperate with 
the international community in global climate agenda in 
a confident and open manner, laying the foundation for 
multilateral solutions to global issues.
China is poised today to accelerate its movement onto 
a new growth pathway toward a clean and vibrant 
economy that provides broadly shared benefits across 
China. EF China will continue to support research for 
an “all-win” pathway for deep decarbonization in China, 
facilitate the green and low-carbon transition of the 
Chinese economy, and help “tell the China New Growth 
Story.” 
2020 has been a rollercoaster of a year. We hope this 
report is a gift at this moment. Our author team has 
spent innumerable hours writing this report around 
the clock and even through lockdowns. I would like 
to extend my deep gratitude and big congratulations 
to the amazing and world-class author team and 
appreciate all the efforts from everyone on the advisory 
roundtable, who spent valuable time among their super 
busy agenda. My special thanks go to my dream team 
in EF China, who are creating a miracle. Without your 
great efforts and help, we would not have been able to 
produce this gift. Thank you! 
Zou Ji 
CEO & President of Energy Foundation China 
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1. INTRODUCTION
China sits today at the confluence of a number of important changes – rapid 
technological, energy, and industrial revolutions, increasing Chinese international 
leadership, a growing and increasingly prosperous middle class, and slowing 
domestic economic growth. In the near term, these trends are intersecting with 
the global economic downturn as well as the health and social implications of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Layered on all of these is the challenge of climate 
change and the need for the global community to address this urgent planetary 
crisis. Together, these changes present a set of challenges as China looks to both 
its immediate and its long-term future.
It is possible to respond to these challenges in a way that navigates a new 
path toward growth in China, even as the economy moves toward carbon 
neutrality before 2060. This is the new growth pathway that will enable China 
to strengthen its economy, create new sources of employment, foster new 
innovation and industrial competitiveness, and in doing so, reach the goal of an 
“ecological civilization.”
Even as China creates this new growth pathway for its own economy, it will 
create broader benefits for addressing global climate change. China’s role in 
climate mitigation is critical. China is currently the world’s largest greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emitter, second only to the United States in cumulative emissions. 
China’s contribution to global emissions reductions is absolutely critical for 
limiting global temperature change within scientifically informed global goals of 
1.5°C or well-below 2°C.  Achieving the new growth pathway would also further 
advance China’s emerging international leadership. The signals that China sends 
to the rest of the world with its actions are increasingly important and influential. 
China’s approach to climate change will communicate this leadership to the 
world during a time of genuine global need.
Avoiding the worst impacts of climate change calls for warming to be limited 
to well below 2°C, and the global community holds hope that warming can 
be limited to 1.5°C. This is a daunting challenge. Net global CO2 emissions 
must decline to zero by around mid-century to have a meaningful chance 
of limiting temperature change to 1.5°C; they must decline to zero around 
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2070 to limit temperature change to 2°C. China’s 
new growth pathway to carbon neutrality will make a 
significant contribution to the global ability to achieve 
these goals. It also implies substantial, rapid, and far-
reaching transitions in Chinese energy, land, urban, and 
industrial systems.  
China is uniquely qualified to take on this challenge. 
Throughout its history, China has committed to 
deliberate and forward-looking national planning. 
This commitment has allowed China to undertake 
large-scale public works from the Great Wall to giant 
aqueducts that move water from the south to the north. 
It has also allowed China to maintain decades of rapid 
economic development and industrialization, leading to 
its position in the global economy today. 14th FYP on 
climate change will be out in Autumn 2021, and the 
supporting plan on climate change will be finalized later 
in Fall at the same year. In addition, as a party to the 
Paris Agreement, China is also called upon to update its 
nationally determined contributions and produce a long-
term mid-century strategy for reducing GHG emissions. 
China’s recent pledge to reach carbon neutrality 
before 2060 and to peak emissions before 2030 is an 
important step toward both of these.
Against this backdrop, the Energy Foundation China has 
commissioned top Chinese universities and think tanks 
along with leading international research institutions 
and experts to initiate a program of new analyses to 
identify low-emissions development pathways for China. 
This is an ongoing project meant to inform China’s near-
term needs for its mid-century strategy and 14th Five-
Year Plan and to build a network of top researchers to 
continue to meet the needs for information and analysis 
over the coming decade. 
This report is the first of what will be a series of multi-
institution reports in support of China’s new growth 
pathway and carbon neutrality goal. It aims to provide 
an overview of pathways designed to meet these 
mutually-reinforcing goals and the issues that might 
arise along the way; present and synthesize both 
existing and new transition scenarios from multiple 
modeling and research teams; and identify a set of 
long-term sectoral strategies and near-term sectoral 
actions that can be taken today to put China on a 
successful, low-emissions growth pathway. As the first 
in what is intended to be a series of synthesis reports, 
it also identifies critical knowledge gaps that need to 
be addressed to support China’s efforts to navigate its 
growth agenda and carbon neutrality goal.
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BOX 1-1. MODELING SCENARIOS USED IN THIS REPORT
This report synthesizes a number of quantitative scenarios from energy 
models, integrated assessment models, and agricultural models. It 
includes a set of scenarios, primarily from the CD-LINKS project, used 
in this report primarily to understand the nature of China’s carbon 
neutrality goal in a global context. This includes scenarios produced 
using GCAM-China, IMAGE 3.0.1, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM 1.0, POLES CD-
LINKS, REMIND MAgPIE 1.7-3.0, and WITCH-GLOBIOM 4.4. This report 
also relies on a broader set of scenarios from multiple models to 
explore the details of China’s economy-wide and sectoral transitions. 
This includes scenarios from economy-wide models that are used to 
explore both sectoral and cross-sectoral strategies – C-GEM, DPEC, 
ERI-LEAP, GCAM-China, IPAC-AIM/technology, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, 
PECE V2.0, PECE_LIU_2019, and POLES-JRC 2019 version. It also includes 
several sectoral models – AGHG-INV (agriculture and land use), CBEM 
(buildings), ERI-Industry (industry), ICCSD-LoMLoG (electric power), and 
Transportation-CATS (transportation) – that are used to provide details 
on specific sectoral transitions. Some of these scenarios can be found 
in the published literature, while others were constructed specifically 
for this report. The scenarios are used selectively throughout the 
report to support conclusions and to illustrate key elements of 
future pathways. As the first report in this series, scenarios are 
largely reported here in their “native” states – that is, only minimal 
efforts have been made to harmonize baselines, sectoral accounting 
approaches, or other methodological concerns that can influence 
comparability across models. Greater harmonization will be undertaken 
in future reports.
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2. CHINA’S NEW 
VISION FOR GROWTH 
AND DEVELOPMENT
The world is changing. Revolutions in science, technology, and how we relate 
to each other are driving increasing connectivity and substantial changes to 
economic productivity. Developments in information technology, including 
artificial intelligence, big data, and quantum information are driving changes in 
how we live, work, and interact. Clean energy technologies such as batteries, 
solar cells, and electric cars, have advanced far more rapidly than anyone 
expected even a decade ago. These trends have created entire new industries, 
economic opportunities, and business models that are fundamentally changing 
global development. The next decades will be crucial as these new global drivers 
of growth and development replace the old ones.
China is also changing. Since the reform and “opening up,” in 1978, China has 
achieved an annual average GDP growth rate of almost 10% and lifted more 
than 850 million people out of poverty (World Bank, 2020). China is now the 
world’s second largest economy, with expanding global influence through trade, 
investment, international leadership, and ideas. As China looks forward, a range 
of forces – China’s evolving relationships with the rest of the world, uncertainties 
on trade and investment, and domestic economic structural changes – present 
both challenges and opportunities. China’s high growth, driven by resource-
intensive and highly-polluting manufacturing, export and investment, and low-
cost labor, is proving unsustainable. Structural constraints, such as declining 
productivity and declining labor force growth, have already reduced China’s 
economic growth. China’s long-term economic expansion is also highlighting 
institutional and social questions. In the short-term, China faces challenges 
from the COVID-19 pandemic and disputes over trade. In the long-term, slowing 
growth within the current paradigm could create challenges for an expanding 
middle-income population increasingly yearning for a life of safety, health, well-
being, and equality. Transitioning to steadier and more sustainable development 
can unlock new possibilities.
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In this context of rapid domestic and global change, 
China has adopted a new vision for growth and 
development that is built around improving people’s 
l ivelihoods and well-being. China’s own policy 
processes have highlighted this clearly. China has 
begun to work toward an “ecological civilization” that 
integrates sustainability into development—a vision 
that is viewed as central to sustaining China’s long-term 
growth and development. As part of this process, the 
Chinese government has committed to the “Beautiful 
China” initiative, an integrative approach for creating 
and implementing new systems for environmental 
protection, developing eco-friendly growth models 
and ways of life, and contributing to global ecological 
security. China’s carbon neutrality goal can be seen 
in this broader context of steady progress toward a 
vision for an “ecological civilization”. It adds a specific 
structure to the overall process and will serve as a 
foundation for China’s new vision for growth and 
development. 
FIGURE 2-1. TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT NATIONAL GOALS. 
(Sources: President Xi’s speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China;  Proposals for formulating the 14th  Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and 
Social Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035; President Xi’s speech at the General Debate of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly )
This new vision for growth and development is built on 
a model of sustainable development featuring greener, 
more efficient, and sustainable consumption and 
production that can help promote living standards and 
a healthier ecosystem—in other words, the "ecological 
civilization". Part of this vision involves moving from 
a focus solely on GDP growth to a more integrative 
view of higher quality development. President Xi, for 
example, framed this as “innovative, coordinated, 
green, and open development that is for everyone.” This 
is reflected in China’s “Two Centenary Goals,” namely 
“building a moderately prosperous society in all respects 
by 2021; and building China into a great modern 
socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by 
2050.”  The new vision for growth and development 
embedded in these formal statements focuses on 
better quality, and more open, inclusive and cohesive 
economic, political and social systems (see Box 2-1).
Importantly, the new growth pathway must aim at 
the China of the future, not the China of today. By 
2060, China will have changed in many ways. China’s 
standard of living will be roughly in line with that of the 
most advanced economies today (Figure 2-2A), and its 
population will be older than it is today (Figure 2-2B). 
China’s population is also expected to continue to 
become more urbanized, with its urbanized population 
projected to be 80% of total population by 2050 (UN-
DESA, 2018). 
2020: Elimination of  
absolute poverty in rural 
areas
2021: Become a moderately 
prosperous society (GDP per 
capita >$10k per person)
~2050: Becoming a fully developed, 
rich and powerful nation, and hence 
realizing wealth for the masses (“get 
rich together”)
2025: Completion of ten 
year plan “Made in China 
2025” to become 70% self 
sufficient in high-tech 
Before 2030: Peak of 
carbon emissions
Before 2060: Carbon neutrality2035: Achieve Basic 
Modernization and beautiful 
China
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FIGURE 2-2. PROJECTION OF CHINA’S GDP PER CAPITA AND CURRENT GDP PER CAPITA IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 2019 (PANEL A) 
AND PROJECTION OF SHARE OF POPULATION ABOVE 65 YEARS OF AGE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (PANEL B). 
(Source Panel A: projection data from Dellink R. et al, 2017; historical data from World Development Indicators, 2020; source Panel B: UN-DESA, 2019)
BENEFITS OF CHINA’S 
NEW GROWTH PATHWAY
The economic transformation embodied in the concepts 
of ecological civilization, beautiful China, and China’s 
carbon-neutrality goal can be seen as a blueprint for 
a new growth pathway. This pathway can deliver 
industrial expansion and competitiveness, jobs, 
economic restructuring, and improved health and a 
cleaner environment through reduced air pollution. 
Industrial expansion and competitiveness. China 
is already a leader in technologies of the emerging 
global green economy, such as solar photovoltaic 
cells, batteries, and electric vehicles—and is poised to 
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BOX 2-1. CONNECTING CHINA’S 2060 CARBON NEUTRALITY GOAL TO CHINA’S LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT GOALS THROUGH 2035
The new growth pathway implied by China’s carbon neutrality goal 
will be rooted in existing goals and policies that have been articulated 
by China. One recent and salient example is the connection between 
China’s new development objectives and its overall technological 
context and growth strategy. The proposals for formulating the 
14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social 
Development and the Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035, 
adopted in 2020, outline China’s major development goals for the next 
15 years. Notable features of these goals include:
  ► Becoming a global leader in innovation by making major 
breakthroughs in core technologies in key areas.
  ► Building a modernized economy through “new industrialization, 
digitalization, urbanization, and agricultural modernization”.
  ► Advancing eco-friendly ways of work and life across all areas of 
society. 
  ► Achieving a “Beautiful China” with steadily declining carbon 
emissions and a fundamental improvement in the environment.
  ► Improving overall lives of its citizens, focusing on well-rounded 
human development.
  ► Strengthening across diverse areas, including but not limited to 
the economy, health, per-capita GDP, inter-regional equity, and 
technology.
Overall, these goals for 2035 are clearly resonant with the strategies 
for carbon neutrality before 2060. The next phases of discussion 
and planning in China will focus on the policies and programs needed 
to connect today’s situation to these 2035 goals and continue this 
transition to 2060. 
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become a global leader in 5G technology and artificial 
intelligence. If structured well, China’s new growth 
pathway will lead to accelerated innovations and 
development in these emerging industries. Investing 
knowledge and human capital in low-carbon industries 
will accelerate innovation and development in sectors 
that will drive the emerging global green economy. 
This will also allow China to solidify its position as 
a leader in the science and technologies of the 21st 
century, leveraging them into a beneficial industrial 
transformation domestically and into long-term 
economic competitiveness in the global green economy 
(see Box 2-3).
Jobs and prosperity. The economic transformation 
reflected in the carbon neutrality goal can promote 
strong employment and broadly shared economic 
prosperity. The size of the global green economy is 
comparable to that of the oil and gas sector (Figure 
2-3A). China’s current strength in the global green 
energy economy is already paying dividends and can 
be expanded rapidly. For example, between 2010 and 
2019, China attracted $818 billion of investment in 
the renewable sector, making it the world’s largest 
market for both solar PV and solar thermal energy. 
38% of all global renewable energy jobs are in China, 
reaching 4.3 million jobs in 2020 (Figure 2-3B). While 
China’s progress toward carbon neutrality will raise 
important challenges as it transitions away from fossil-
based economic activities (see Box 2-3), it will also 
create expanded job opportunities across the spectrum 
of industrial activity, including battery production, 
renewable energy, construction (e.g. retrofitting existing 
buildings), and related services (e.g. shared mobility) 
(Huang et al., 2020). China’s leadership in key 
technologies underpinning the evolving international 
energy industry will put the country in a position 
for strong job growth and industrial gains in these 
industries (see Box 2-3). 
FIGURE 2-3. SIZE OF GLOBAL GREEN ECONOMY IN 2017 (PANEL A) AND GLOBAL RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN 
2019 (PANEL B).
 (Source: FTSE Russell, 2018; IRENA, 2020)
Structural reform. The carbon neutrality goal will 
facilitate China’s industrial structural reform as it shifts 
away from polluting, carbon-intensive industries to 
low-carbon industries. The low-carbon transition will 
increase industrial total factor productivity, change 
production methods, and cultivate new business 
models, therefore helping to achieve China’s goal of 
structural adjustment, optimization, and upgrade. 
Enhanced energy security. As one of the world’s 
largest crude oil consumers, China surpassed the 
U.S. to become the world’s largest importer of crude 
oil in 2018 (IEA, 2020). China is also the world’s 
largest consumer and importer of coal. In 2019, 
China consumed 2,870 Mtce of coal comprising 53% 
of the global consumption and imported 21% of the 
coal in the international market (IEA, 2020). The 
heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels undermines 
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China’s energy security. China’s progress toward 
carbon neutrality will allow it to install more domestic 
renewable energy capacity, reducing its reliance on 
imported fossil fuels and leading to enhanced energy 
security.
Improved health, cleaner air. The carbon neutrality 
goal will improve the health of citizens, save lives, and 
improve China’s natural environment by reducing air 
pollution. Implementing a low-carbon transition strategy 
will decrease the reliance on coal across the economy 
– in electricity generation, industry, and buildings – 
and support a new generation of low-pollution vehicles. 
These actions will dramatically reduce health risks 
associated with fine particulates (PM2.5), SO2, and NOX 
emissions. Current air quality standards are insufficient 
to meet long-term goals, but combining these standards 
with the low-carbon development implied by China’s 
carbon neutrality goal will put China on a path to meet 
the highest WHO air quality standards (see Box 2-2). 
As the old growth and development strategy comes to 
its end, China has identified a new vision for growth 
and development. Now is a critical moment to move 
forward on this vision. China’s carbon neutrality goal 
will serve as a foundation for this new vision. It will 
promote greener, more efficient, and sustainable 
consumption and production with better quality, more 
open, inclusive and cohesive economic, political and 
social systems and an "ecological civilization" that is 
more harmonious with the natural ecosystem.
BOX 2-2. THE MUTUALLY-REINFORCING GOALS OF HEALTH, AIR QUALITY, AND CLIMATE MITIGATION
Because emission sources of air pollutants are highly linked to those 
of GHGs, Strategies to reduce GHG emissions can significantly improve 
air quality and public health, and vice versa. Air pollutants are often co-
emitted from major sources of GHGs, including fossil-fuel combustion, 
industrial processes, waste disposal, agriculture, and land-use change 
(IPCC, 1990). In addition, most air pollutants (e.g. black carbon, sulfate, 
nitrate, ozone) have an effect on the climate. The effective forcing 
from aerosol-radiation interactions and overall aerosol forcing can be 
as high as -0.45 (-0.95~+0.05) W/m2 and -0.9 (-0.95~+0.05) W/m2 
respectively (IPCC, 2014). 
Over the past decade, China has made significant improvements in 
air quality. However, China is still confronted with challenges rooted 
in air pollution and public health. This is especially true in the context 
of an aging population that will be more susceptible to air quality and 
associated health concerns.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that addressing GHGs and air 
pollutants simultaneously will be easier and cheaper than addressing 
them individually (e.g., Li et al., 2019). Nam et al. (2013) estimated 
if China reduced SO2 and NOX emissions by 8%–10% per five year 
during 2015–2050, a total of 20 Gt CO2 emissions could be decreased 
in 2050. Tong et al. (2020) found that if China fulfilled the Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) pledges and current clean air actions, 
major air pollutant emissions (e.g. SO2, NOX, primary PM2.5, and VOCs) 
would decrease by 29% to 52% during 2015-2030. With more strict 
climate mitigation actions to limit warming to well-below-2°C warming 
and best end-of-pipe control measures, these major air pollutant 
emissions would further decrease by 36%-61% between 2030 and 
2050. (Tong et al., 2020). Li et al. (2018) found that a carbon price along 
with an annual 4% reduction in carbon intensity could decrease China’s 
population-weighted PM2.5 concentration by 12%, avoiding 94,000 PM2.5-
related premature deaths in 2030 compared to what would happen 
without these climate mitigation actions. Li et al. (2019) found that a 
2°C-consistent energy transition combined with the best air pollution 
control could reduce China’s population-weighted PM2.5 concentration to 
nearly 16 μg/m3 in 2050. Importantly, research has shown that current 
air pollution policies will deliver only small air quality improvements 
after 2030. Combining ambitious climate targets with air pollution 
control, China’s PM2.5 air quality could come close to or well below the 
WHO Guideline of 10 μg/m3 in 2050 (Cheng et al., 2020).
Coal-fired power plants have long been a dominant source of China’s air 
pollution and carbon emissions. Effective “co-governance” of pollution 
and carbon emissions within the power sector needs to focus on low-
carbon structural adjustments and power efficiency improvements. 
Structural adjustments focus most heavily on increasing the share 
of renewable power generation. Efficiency improvements include 
upgrading existing units, closing down outdated power plants, and 
reducing coal consumption per unit of power generation through the 
combination of the first two. Previous studies have demonstrated these 
measures can deliver significant benefits for both air pollution and 
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carbon emissions. Yang et al. (2018) found that if the solar photovoltaic 
power capacity reaches 400 GW in 2030, CO2 emissions would decline 
by 4.2%, and 1.2% air pollution-related premature deaths would be 
avoided. Lu et al. (2019) found that 9.3% CO2 and 12% PM2.5 emissions 
reductions from 2015 levels could be obtained by replacing 1,050 
TWh of coal-fired electricity generation with coal-fired bioenergy 
gasification systems with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CBECCS). 
Power sector efficiency can be increased by shutting down small and 
inefficient plants, thereby increasing the fraction of China’s large power 
units (with capacity larger than 600MW) to 80% in 2030. This would 
reduce the CO2 and SO2 emissions by 25% and 5% respectively (Tong et 
al., 2018).
The industrial sector also plays a central role in both carbon emissions 
and air pollution. Control measures for the industrial sector mainly 
include curtailing industrial energy demand through technological 
upgrades and increasing low-carbon energy shares by eliminating and 
substituting for fossil fuels. For example, research shows that with 
640 million tonnes of steel demand in 2030, an increase of 50% in the 
scrap recovery rate could lead to 190 million tonnes of recovered steel 
and reduce CO2, SO2, NOX and PM10 emissions by 67.7 million tonnes and 
110,000, 20,000, 30,000 tonnes. This could prevent 30,000 to 70,000 
air pollution-related premature deaths and reduce economic losses by 
$386-854 million (Ma et al., 2016). 
With the rapid growth of car ownership, energy consumption in the 
transportation sector has increased dramatically in recent years, 
resulting in commensurate air pollution and GHG emissions. Energy 
efficiency improvements, switching to low-carbon fuels, and mode 
shifting are major measures to reduce carbon emissions and improve 
air quality. Liu et al (2018) showed that 38% and 35% CO2 emission 
reductions could be achieved in 2050 by improving transport energy 
efficiency and increasing the use of electricity in the fleet. These two 
measures could avoid more than 120,000 and 102,000 air pollution-
related premature deaths (Liu et al., 2018). 
In residential buildings, improved living quality is leading to higher 
service demands and associated environmental pressures. Substituting 
clean and low-carbon fuels (e.g. electricity from grid or building-
integrated PV (BIPV) and new biomass energy) for bulk coal in China’s 
vast rural and urban areas will be necessary for residential pollution 
and CO2 co-control. Cost-benefit assessments have demonstrated 
remarkable climate, air quality, and health co-benefits from 
transitioning away from residential coal and traditional biomass. Liu et 
al (2019a) found that clean residential fuels replacement could avoid 
4% of outdoor air pollution-related mortality. Co-benefits on indoor 
air pollution-related health impacts are more significant, with a 31% 
reduction in mortality compared with the baseline (Liu et al., 2018).
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BOX 2-3. EMPLOYMENT IN THE NEW ECONOMY
China’s transformation to a low-carbon economy can promote strong 
employment growth across a broad range of industries and deliver 
broadly shared economic prosperity. In this transition, employment 
will shift away from fossil fuels and toward the emerging industries of 
the 21st century. Emerging analysis increasingly highlights the positive 
employment effects of these technologies, and underscores the natural 
transition toward new technologies as they become cheaper and more 
effective than older ones. Countries that embrace such changes quickly 
have the opportunity to lead in the global economy of the 21st century.
Current employment in the low-carbon sectors. China’s current 
strength in the global green energy economy is already paying 
dividends through new jobs, and these can be expanded rapidly. 
Employment in low-carbon technology and service sectors has 
increased rapidly over the past decade and will continue to do so driven 
by the transformation to a low-carbon economy. Between 2010 and 
2019, China attracted $818 billion investment in the renewable sector 
and became the world’s largest market for both solar PV and solar 
thermal energy. Today, 38% of all global renewable energy jobs, or 4.4 
million jobs, are in China (IRENA, 2020). 
In fact, China already leads the world in employment in at least four 
major renewable energy industries. China accounts for 59% of PV 
employment worldwide, with 2.2 million jobs; 44% of offshore and 
onshore wind employment worldwide, with 500,000 jobs; 29% of 
hydropower employment, with 600,000 jobs; and 81% of solar heating 
and cooling employment, with 700,000 jobs (IRENA, 2020). 
Future growth in clean energy jobs. China’s leadership in the key 
technologies that underpin the evolving international energy industry 
will put the country in a position for strong job growth and economic 
gains in these industries. Global employment in renewable energy is 
anticipated to grow fourfold by 2050 (IRENA, 2020). China’s progress 
toward carbon neutrality will create expanded job opportunities across 
the spectrum of industrial activities, including renewable energy and 
storage, construction, and related services such as shared mobility 
(Huang et al., 2020). Beyond these direct employment opportunities 
in the renewable energy-related industries, China’s current focus 
on promoting innovation and identifying key strategic industries as 
“environmentally friendly, low-carbon, and circular”—such as next-
generation telecommunication, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, 
and big data—as will not only create other job opportunities in these 
sectors, but will also support green jobs and the structural economic 
changes that are part of a transition to a low-carbon economy (MHRSS, 
2019). 
Policy support. While the overall employment prospects of a low-
carbon transition appear positive, there will be near-term job losses 
in fossil fuel and other carbon-intensive industries. China’s specific 
policy approaches will help to determine the balance between these job 
losses and employment gains in low-carbon industries and services. 
If designed well, the current trend of job creation in the low-carbon 
economy, combined with a dedicated policy framework to address the 
challenge of job losses while moving away from coal in particular, can 
support a fair and well-structured transition towards a green economy. 
There is increasingly robust evidence supporting the possibility for 
a just transition and job gains in low-carbon industries and services 
across other countries and regions (Caldecott et al., 2017; Gales and 
Hölsgens, 2017; Herpich et al., 2018). Additionally, recent research 
shows the potential for retraining in green industries (OECD, 2019; 
Bowen et al., 2018). Research also suggests that If job transitions are 
strategically managed with carefully designed supportive policies, 
short-run growth can be achieved in the green economy with minimal 
impacts on workers (Bowen et al., 2018). These supportive policies 
include skills development and training programs, capacity building, 
and vocational training programs. Because workers in the coal industry 
generally have lower education levels and limited employment choices 
(Fei, 2018), such training programs will be important elements of 
China's policy strategy to a low-carbon economy.
Despite promising initial research, our understanding of job market 
dynamics remains somewhat  limited, and more research on the 
employment effects of policy packages, taking into account the specific 
situation across China, will be needed to improve the knowledge base 
that climate policy can build upon. Several studies have looked at 
quantifying the employment effects of China’s transformation towards 
a low-carbon economy, but more research and analysis are needed 
to elucidate the most important factors that will drive effective policy 
strategies.
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3. KEY ELEMENTS 
OF A LONG-TERM 
STRATEGY
In 2015, in Paris, parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) reached a landmark agreement to combat climate 
change. The Paris Agreement has as one of its central goals “holding the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”.  China’s recent announcement of its 
long-term carbon neutrality goal will make a significant contribution to this 
global effort. In September of 2020, Xi Jinping pledged to the UN General 
Assembly that China aims “to have CO2 emissions peak before 2030 and 
achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” China’s pledge demonstrates its 
commitment to global environmental leadership and an understanding of the 
role that climate mitigation can play in supporting China’s vision for growth 
and development in a rapidly changing world.
China’s global leadership on climate change is essential. China is now the 
second largest economy in the world, and it became the world’s largest CO2 
emitter in 2006. At the same time, China’s approach to carbon neutrality 
needs to take into account its unique circumstances. As a growing economy, 
China’s emissions per unit of economic output ranked 16th in the world, and 
its emissions per capita ranked 49th, or about half that of the United States 
(Gilfillan et al., 2019; UNFCCC, 2019; BP, 2019). In 2018, China’s fossil 
fuel and industrial CO2 and GHG emissions stood at 10.1 GtCO2 and 12.7 
GtCO2eq (Global Carbon Atlas). China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and 
cement grew an average of 1.4% every year between 2010 and 2018. The 
largest share of emissions came from electricity and heat (51%), followed by 
industry (28%) and transportation (10%) (IEA, 2020a). Moving away from 
traditional energy sources will need to be done in a way that ensures new 
opportunities for broadly shared prosperity.
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FIGURE 3-1. HISTORICAL CO2 EMISSIONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (PANEL A); HISTORICAL EMISSIONS INTENSITY (RELATIVE TO 
ECONOMIC OUTPUT) IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (PANEL B); HISTORICAL EMISSIONS PER CAPITA IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (PANEL C); 
HISTORICAL EMISSIONS BY SECTOR IN CHINA (PANEL D). 
(Data source: EIA, The Global Carbon Project; IEA, 2020a)
Like all countries, COVID-19 has affected China’s 
economy, and its GHG emissions. During the first half 
of 2020, CO2 emissions dropped by 3.7%. Emissions 
dropped most precipitously in February (-18.4%), 
followed by March (-9.2%). Emissions rebounded, 
however, and were 5% above 2019 levels by May, 
2020 as economic activities resumed (Liu et al., 
2020). While the pandemic will undoubtedly influence 
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China’s near-term strategy, the long-term ramifications 
of the pandemic are not clear. China’s long-term 
strategy needs to address both the nearer-term 
ramifications of COVID-19 and China’s long-term vision 
for growth and development.
Based on the most recent science, the guidance from 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
is that net global CO2 emissions need to reach zero – 
that is, carbon neutrality – around 2050 in order to 
limit warming to 1.5°C and around 2070 or 2080 in 
order to limit warming to 2.0°C.  Emissions of non-CO2 
gases need to be substantially reduced over this same 
period (IPCC, 2018)*. This guidance from the IPCC 
is based on a body of research that identifies a much 
broader range of possibilities for the timing of carbon 
neutrality. Some scenarios on which this guidance is 
based reach net zero global CO2 emissions as early 
as 2040, and some do not reach net zero global 
emissions until well after 2060. The different results 
reflect both uncertainty and strategic choices. Many 
key drivers of emissions cannot be known with any 
meaningful certainty today – for example, population 
and demographic change, economic growth, and the 
advance of technology. The climate science behind 
this guidance is also uncertain and continues to 
evolve. Strategic choices include how much to reduce 
emissions over the coming decade versus the decades 
that follow, how much to rely on negative emissions 
options (e.g., afforestation, BECCS, and direct air 
capture) in the second half of the century to allow for 
less ambitious mitigation over the coming decades, 
and the degree to which non-CO2 GHGs, aerosols, and 
aerosol precursor emissions are reduced. In general, 
the later that net CO2 emissions reach zero, the greater 
will be the need for substantial reductions in non-CO2 
GHGs and the greater will be the reliance on negative 
emissions options in the second half of the century. The 
IPCC guidance attempts to find a balance between what 
is achievable today and limiting the use of negative 
emissions options, particularly in the second half of the 
century.
In this light, China’s pledge to reach carbon neutrality 
before 2060 is a significant contribution to the 
international processes for limiting warming to 1.5°C. 
*　 Note that neither of these net zero goals guarantees that temperature will be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C. Rather, they are based on a 50% 
chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C and a 66% chance to limit warming to 2°C.
It is consistent with recent global modeling studies 
that try to identify the most globally “cost-effective” 
pathways to 1.5°C (see Figure 3-2). At the same time, 
the sooner before 2060 that China can reduce its 
emissions to zero or near-zero, the greater the chance 
of limiting warming to 1.5°C. While the global goal 
is to reach carbon neutrality around mid-century, 
different countries may do so at different times while 
still giving the world a good chance to limit warming 
to 1.5°C. Within the context of the Paris Agreement, 
countries need to build their long-term strategies based 
on national circumstances such as their domestic low-
carbon energy and land resources, their strategies for 
growth and development, and their ability to sequester 
carbon and to eke out the final emissions reductions 
needed to reach zero. Different ways of looking at 
equity and fairness will also influence perceptions of 
when different countries should reach carbon neutrality 
relative to one another. Approaching the question 
from the perspective of global economic efficiency, for 
example, leads to different conclusions than asking 
the same question from the perspective of equity, 
measured, for example, in terms of per-capita emissions 
or historical responsibility (e.g., van den Bergh et al., 
2020). These various perspectives cannot be reconciled 
into a single number for any country. They do, however, 
provide a sense of the range of possibilities. 
China intends to achieve carbon neutrality before 
2060. Regardless of precisely when China reaches 
carbon neutrality, it is essential that its CO2 emissions 
peak quickly and, depending on the actions of other 
countries, be brought very close to zero around mid-
century in order to limit warming to 1.5°C. China 
cannot wait to start reducing emissions or continue 
with substantial emissions through 2060. The concept 
of carbon neutrality is a valuable organizing framework 
for international action, but what ultimately matters for 
limiting warming is the totality of emissions over time 
– “cumulative emissions” – and not just the emissions 
at mid-century. Earlier peaking and faster long-term 
reductions will help to limit China’s cumulative CO2 
emissions. Indeed, both global and national studies 
consistently call for China’s emissions to peak almost 
immediately in order to limit temperature change to 
1.5°C (Figure 3-2). Scenarios that limit warming to 2°C 
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may peak toward 2030 (Figure 3-2). 
If China’s CO2 emissions do not peak before 2030, 
not only will its cumulative emissions be higher, it 
will create substantial challenges for reaching carbon 
neutrality by 2060 and limiting cumulative emissions 
because China’s economy will be “locked in” to higher 
emitting assets that will be difficult to move away from, 
for example, new coal-fired power plants; and it will 
limit the time for the broader societal, economic, and 
energy system transitions needed to limit emissions. In 
other words, delay would put in doubt the prospects for 
achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.
FIGURE 3-2. CHINA’S CO2 AND SELECTED NON-CO2 GHG EMISSIONS FOR 1.5°C AND 2.0°C SCENARIOS FROM SELECTED SCENARIOS. 
The table shows full ranges of key variables from the selected scenarios. (Sources: CD-LINKS global scenarios (McCollum et al., 2018; Roelfsema et al., 2020) and national emissions pathways for 
China from GCAM-China).  
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Carbon neutrality is an economy-wide challenge, 
requiring substantial emissions reductions across 
all sectors of the economy, including buildings, 
industry, transportation, electricity generation, refining, 
agriculture, and forestry. Emissions must be brought to 
zero even as China’s economy continues to grow. Each 
sector presents its own challenges and opportunities 
and will not follow a unique timeline (Figure 3-3). 
Nonetheless, at least two strategic themes emerge both 
from existing research and the new research supporting 
this report. First, electricity provides greater near-
term opportunities for emissions reductions relative to 
other sectors, due to the many low-carbon electricity 
generation options and the increasing competitiveness 
of wind and solar power in particular. In addition, 
decarbonization of electricity generation is an important 
enabling condition for the decarbonization of end-
use service sectors via electrification. This does not 
obviate the need for immediate action across all 
sectors; it only highlights that it will be possible to 
achieve substantial emissions reductions in electricity 
more quickly than in other sectors. Second, there are 
a number of applications in which low-cost mitigation 
options do not exist today. This includes, for example, 
air transport, industrial processes, and high temperature 
heat. Research typically anticipates that these will be 
the last sectors to be decarbonized or that they may 
never be fully decarbonized. For this reason, many 
studies envision that deep reductions in sectors such 
as industry and transport may be slower than in other 
sectors. At the same time, technology is evolving 
rapidly, and opportunities for mitigation decades from 
now may be very different than those of today. Effective 
strategy will therefore make progress on emissions 
reductions today, leave open options for adjustments 
as technology evolves, and invest in creating the 
technological options to address hard-to-decarbonize 
sectors.
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FIGURE 3-3. CO2 EMISSIONS FROM SELECTED MODELS IN 2035 AND 2050 IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS ALONG WITH ACTUAL CO2 
EMISSIONS IN 2015 (TOP PANEL); SECTORAL CO2 REDUCTIONS ACROSS MODELS RELATIVE TO 2015 (BOTTOM TABLE). 
Note that percentages are calculated based on 2015 numbers from the scenarios rather than from China’s inventories, to allow for differences in base year numbers. Differences in base year 
numbers arise from differences in sectoral accounting methodologies among models. Negative values indicate increases. Note also that subsets of scenarios were used to calculate ranges in each 
sector. The choice of scenarios included for each sector can be found in Section 4 of this report. Models used in the bottom table include ERI-Industry, GCAM-China, ICCSD-LoMLoG, IPAC-AIM/
technology, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, PECE_LIU_2019, PECE V2.0, POLES-JRC 2019, and Transportation-CATS. (Source for 2015 data: IEA, 2019b)
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BOX 3-1. LINKING NATIONAL SCENARIOS TO CHINA’S CARBON NEUTRALITY GOAL AND TO LIMITING WARMING TO 1.5°C
This report explores the national and sectoral transitions necessary 
to meet China’s carbon neutrality goal and limit warming to 1.5°C. 
Exploring national and sectoral transitions requires modeling and 
analytical tools with sufficient levels of detail on China and the 
key sectors within China that will need to transition to low-carbon 
configurations. All of the national scenarios in this study are consistent 
with carbon neutrality before 2060, and several are on track to achieve 
carbon neutrality not long after 2050.
In general, to allow for this sufficient level of detail, these models only 
represent dynamics in China or in specific sectors in China—that is, 
they do not represent the transitions taking place in the rest of the 
world. This narrower focus on China and sectors within China, while 
advantageous for understanding national and sectoral dynamics, also 
limits the ability to use these tools, by themselves, to understand 
whether the scenarios they produce are consistent with long-term 
temperature goals such as 1.5°C. Because climate change is the result 
of emissions across the world, only global models are capable of 
exploring the distribution of emissions reductions across countries. 
While it is possible to assess the consistency of national scenarios 
with China’s carbon neutrality goal, it is not possible to assess their 
consistency with broader temperature goals without comparing them 
to the results of global scenarios.
To assess the consistency of the national scenarios, we have compared 
their national energy emissions to those emerging from the global 
models for China. All of the 1.5°C scenarios from national models 
explored here led to emissions reductions within the range of the global 
scenarios in 2050, although several temporarily fall out of the range. 
The national scenarios reach emissions reductions of between 90% 
and 100% in 2050 relative to 2015 levels. This range of reductions lies 
at the lower end of the range for China from global scenarios and can 
therefore be considered as roughly consistent with limiting warming to 
1.5°C. All put China in position to reach carbon neutrality before 2060.
FIGURE 1. CO2 EMISSIONS ACROSS NATIONAL MODELS AND GLOBAL MODELS WITH NATIONAL RESULTS. 
Note that not all models include CO2 emissions from agriculture, forestry, and other land use.
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Reaching carbon neutrality before 2060 implies a rapid 
and extensive scale-up of low-carbon energy at the 
same time that China’s overall energy consumption is 
initially growing. While the overall trajectory of China’s 
energy evolution is uncertain and dependent on a broad 
range of socioeconomic and technological drivers, the 
scenarios synthesized in this report generally portray 
a slowing of recent growth in the near-term followed 
by a gradual decline in overall energy production and 
consumption (Figure 3-4). Against this backdrop 
of change in the overall scale of the energy system, 
scenarios explored in this study include an upscaling of 
low-carbon sources—including fossil energy with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (CCUS)—from about 
6% in 2015, to about 30-65% and 70-85% of total 
primary energy use by 2035 and 2050, respectively 
(Figure 3-4A). These shares are broadly consistent with 
similar numbers identified in the IPCC Special Report 
on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018) at the global 
scale. The non-fossil share in primary energy use would 
correspondingly increase from 6% in 2015 to 20-60% 
and almost 50-75% by 2035 and 2050, respectively.
FIGURE 3-4A. PRIMARY ENERGY IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS SYNTHESIZED IN THIS REPORT.
Left panel shows total primary energy in selected scenarios. Right panel shows primary energy for four illustrative scenarios. Differences in base-year numbers arise due to differences in 
inventories, different ways of calculating primary energy, and different projections, as 2015 is a projection year in some models.Primary energy in this report is estimated based on the direct 
equivalent method, different from the method used in Chinese statistics.
Implementation of these strategies will also lead to a 
change in energy carriers used in building, industry, 
and transportation. Most notably, it is anticipated 
that electricity will play a far greater role in China’s 
future energy system than it does today. Much of this 
electrification will occur in the transportation sector, 
which uses very little electricity today. Challenges of 
pervasive electrification remain high in the industry 
sector with alternative fuels such as hydrogen and 
(sustainable) bioenergy potentially serving as options in 
the longer-term when emissions will need to be driven 
out of the hard-to-decarbonize sectors. Electrification 
offers the opportunity to curb and eventually reduce 
final energy consumption due to significantly higher 
efficiencies in many applications, for example in 
transportation, where electric drive trains have 
substantially higher tank-to-wheel efficiencies than 
internal combustion drive trains.
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FIGURE 3-4B. FINAL ENERGY IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS SYNTHESIZED IN THIS REPORT. 
Left panel shows total final energy in selected scenarios. Right panel shows final energy for four illustrative scenarios. Differences in base-year numbers arise due to differences in inventories and 
different projections, as 2015 is a projection year in some models.
Several cross-cutting strategies emerge from both the 
economy-wide scenarios synthesized here and other 
studies of deep decarbonization. Different sectors will 
put different emphases on these cross-cutting strategies 
(Figure 3-5). In order to limit warming to 1.5°C or 
2°C, these decarbonization strategies will need to be 
complemented by comparable actions to reduce non-
CO2 emissions. Cross-cutting decarbonization strategies 
include:
  ► Promoting sustainable demand in all end-use 
sectors while maintaining high living standards 
through more efficient use of energy, structural 
change, urban planning, and lifestyle changes.
  ► Decarbonizing electricity generation by phasing out 
coal power generation without CCUS and rapidly 
increasing generation from a diverse portfolio 
of technologies dominated by renewables and 
supplemented by nuclear, and fossil or bioenergy 
with CCUS.
  ► Electrifying end-use sectors by increasing electric 
vehicles, using electricity for low-temperature heat 
in industrial applications, and transitioning to 
electric space and water heating in buildings (e.g., 
heat pumps).
  ► Switching to low-carbon fuels like hydrogen and 
biomass in industry (as fuel or feedstock) and 
transportation (e.g., long-haul trucking, shipping, 
and aviation) when electrification is not feasible or 
economically viable.
  ► Sequestering carbon in natural systems (e.g., forest 
and soil) or through CO2 removal technologies 
to facilitate carbon neutrality even if emissions 
do not reach zero in some hard-to-decarbonize 
applications, such as air travel or high temperature 
process heat.
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FIGURE 3-5. CROSS-CUTTING MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION IN DIFFERENT SECTORS.
Fundamental to all of these strategies is the need to 
phase out the use of coal without CCUS across all 
sectors (See Box 3-2). All mitigation studies agree on a 
more or less rapid phase-out of the use of coal without 
CCUS across the entire economy under stringent 
climate goals. This affects, foremost, the electricity and 
industry sectors where coal at present constitutes a 
large fraction of fuel input. The speed of this transition 
can be moderated by deploying CCUS technologies (e.g., 
in power plants, hydrogen and ammonia production, 
and primary steel and cement production) that capture 
the majority of CO2 from fuel combustion and industrial 
processes and either reuse it or store it underground. 
CCUS deployment can help reduce the pace at 
which coal mines need to close down and coal-based 
industries need to restructure with possibly positive 
benefits for labor market disruptions (see Chapter 5). 
CCUS will not, however, obviate the need to rapidly 
transition away from coal as a primary fuel source.
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BOX 3-2. PHASING OUT COAL IN THE ENERGY SYSTEM
Phasing out coal power in China’s energy system is one of the most 
beneficial and technologically easiest near-term steps toward China’s 
new growth pathway, as well as a complicated challenge that requires 
careful planning and implementation to ensure continued prosperity, 
employment, and economic growth. As the world’s largest coal 
consumer and producer, coal is deeply embedded in China’s energy 
system and its economy. Coal contributed 58% of China’s total primary 
energy consumption in 2019 (NBS, 2020). It is widely used in electricity 
generation, steel and cement production, building materials, chemicals, 
and buildings. Due to progress made during 12th and 13th five-year plans 
(2011-2020), China’s total coal consumption declined after 2013, but it 
has increased again in recent years, approaching its 2013 peak in 2019. 
A rapid shift away from coal to non-emitting energy sources will be 
important for delivering on a wide number of the priorities associated 
with China’s growth and development agenda. And it will be essential 
for reaching carbon neutrality before 2060. Accordingly, China needs 
to enter a new phase, turning quickly from controlling coal growth to 
accelerating a phaseout of coal without CCUS in all sectors. 
Coal phaseout across different sectors. The phaseout timeline will 
vary across sectors based on different technical and institutional 
challenges as well as near-term benefits brought by early actions. 
Scattered coal combustion for industrial small furnaces and boilers and 
residential heating and cooking in rural areas can be eliminated first 
and within the 14th Five-Year plan (2021-2025). Within the power sector, 
coal power generation should be eliminated by around 2040 to 2045 
to limit warming to 1.5°C. Coal consumption without CCUS in industrial 
sectors that are difficult to electrify (e.g., as a feedstock in steel 
production) should be eliminated around 2055-2060.
  ► Residential and industrial scattered coal. Significant progress 
has been made in reducing scattered coal use during the past 
decade, especially in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region. The progress 
has been achieved by shutting down inefficient and polluting small 
furnaces and boilers in the industrial sector, and through wide 
implementation of coal-to-gas and coal-to-electricity switching in 
rural residential heating supported by public subsidies. These actions 
can feasibly be replicated rapidly across the country in combination 
with increasing use of renewable energy technologies, such as roof-
top PV and biomass in the residential sector. In addition, phasing out 
scattered coal is one of the most effective near-term approaches 
to reduce local air pollutant emissions and generate human health 
benefits. It should be a priority during the 14th FYP.
  ► Coal-fired power generation. Phasing out coal is particularly 
important in the electricity sector, which accounts for 54% of 
China’s total coal consumption (EPPEI, 2019). Through an immediate 
halt of new construction of coal-fired power plants, rapid retirement 
of a small portion of old, dirty, inefficient coal plants in the near 
term, and gradually reduced utilization of the remaining majority of 
operating plants, China can phase out coal power generation without 
CCUS by around 2040-2045 (Cui et al., 2020). Several provinces 
have specific near-term opportunities. Shandong, Inner Mongolia, and 
Shanxi are the top three coal consuming provinces. Shandong has the 
highest installed coal power capacity, and its share of small, old, and 
inefficient coal plants is larger than other provinces. Moreover, over 
a third of the total capacity in Shandong are industrial self-use plants 
not connected to the grid. They often have higher environmental 
impacts due to challenges in enforcing regulations and policies. Coal 
retirements could be implemented more rapidly in Shandong due to 
these less favorable technical attributes of its coal plants. In doing 
so, Shandong would be able to increase overall demand for green 
energy (likely imported initially from neighboring provinces) and 
accelerate the restructuring of its economy from heavy to service 
industries.
  ► Industry coal use. Coal consumption in iron and steel production, 
building materials, the coal chemical industry, and cement together 
account for over 40% of China’s total coal consumption (EPPEI, 
2019). Phasing out coal without CCUS in these sectors requires 
a combination of strategies, including efficiency improvements, 
electrification, low-carbon fuel switching (i.e., to zero-carbon 
hydrogen or modern biomass), and demand reductions through 
economic and industrial structural changes. Some of the approaches 
can be implemented immediately (i.e., energy efficiency), while 
others may take longer and depend on technological and institutional 
changes. 
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FIGURE 1. NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL COAL POWER PHASEOUT PATHWAYS IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
(Source: Cui et al., 2020)
Societal benefits and challenges beyond climate mitigation. Phasing 
out China’s reliance on coal will bring considerable benefits beyond 
climate mitigation, including continuous improvements in air quality 
and human health, enhanced energy independence and energy access 
through low-cost renewables, and the creation of new jobs and growth 
opportunities in a green economy. 
  ► Air quality and human health. In the past decade, air quality and 
health benefits have increased dramatically from shutting down 
obsolete coal fleets and eliminating scattered coal use in China. With 
recent policy efforts, air quality has largely improved in the Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei area. However, major cities in the large coal-consuming 
provinces, such as Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi, still face severe 
air pollution problems, and often rank at the bottom in terms of local 
air quality across the country. For these regions, lowering PM2.5 
concentrations is a central motivation for eliminating scattered 
coal consumption in residential and industrial uses. Phasing out coal 
in the energy system will not only deliver significant, immediate, 
and broadly shared health benefits, it will also provide a necessary 
path towards long-term improvements in air quality to the highest 
standards (Tong et al., 2020).
  ► Restructuring of local economies. Phasing out coal will also bring 
opportunities to the major coal producing and exporting provinces, 
including Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. With an increasing 
reliance on coal to support their economies, they are increasingly 
vulnerable to the well-known “resource curse” of overdependence 
on low-value and volatile resource extractive industries. Both Shanxi 
and Inner Mongolia have experienced difficult economic conditions 
due to volatility in coal markets. With abundant renewable resources, 
these provinces have the opportunity to diversify their energy 
portfolios and their economic systems to find a new impetus for 
long-term growth. With the inevitability of a transition away from 
fossil fuels, it is important to begin now and ease the transition 
instead of continuing on the current course and facing a crisis with 
little time to react.
  ► Employment. Phasing out coal will reduce the number of older 
jobs across the entire coal supply chain from mining to fuel 
processing, conversion, and end-use. Given the fundamental role 
of coal in the Chinese economy at present, employment in the 
coal industry will, in the short term, be heavily affected by the 
low-carbon transition (Huang et al., 2018, 2019, 2020; Shi et al., 
2018). Due to the combination of stagnating coal consumption and 
increasing labor productivity as a result of continued mechanization, 
the number of workers in coal mining and washing has already 
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decreased by over 40%, from 5.3 million in 2013 to 3.2 million in 
2018 (He et al., 2020b). These changes are inevitable even without 
enhanced climate mitigation (Shi et al., 2018), but will be further 
accelerated on a pathway towards carbon neutrality before 2060. 
Moreover, employment and economic impacts tend to have different 
distributional effects within the provinces. Specific communities that 
have traditionally centered around a coal economy are expected 
to be hit the hardest. About 25% of China’s total coal employment 
is in Shanxi province, followed by Shandong, Henan, Anhui, and 
Heilongjiang. These regions have experienced different levels of 
challenges in managing the coal job losses in the past five to seven 
years and will need to continue to find solutions to carefully manage 
the social implications of these losses along with those that will 
occur from an accelerated coal phaseout (China Coal Cap Project, 
2019). 
Achieving a high-ambition coal transition in China in a just and 
equitable way must be a policy priority. Possible approaches include 
carefully designing and implementing a comprehensive policy package 
that includes resettlement and retirement policies for older workers, 
retraining and education programs for younger workers, fiscal policies 
to provide compensation and financial support to both individuals and 
companies, and economic incentives to create new businesses and 
development opportunities for the local economy. Coal mining is a tough 
job with high health impacts and security concerns. A coal phaseout 
with effective transition management can help provide a better quality 
of life for millions of coal workers and for China’s future energy 
workforce.  
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BOX 3-3. INNOVATION AND THE RAPID PACE OF CHANGE IN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Technology is at the heart of climate mitigation. Without technology 
options that can compete with fossil fuels and that can support broader 
priorities such as clean air, it will be difficult to limit temperature 
change to 2°C or 1.5°C. A number of technologies—PV cells, batteries, 
digitalization—are changing the mitigation landscape and providing 
cost-effective options for near-term decarbonization. But they may not 
be enough in the long run. More innovation is needed.
FIGURE 1. GLOBAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE LEVELIZED COST OF ELECTRICITY (LCOE) FROM UTILITY-SCALE RENEWABLE POWER 
GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES, 2010 AND 2019.
 (Source: IRENA, 2020)
China’s long-term strategy needs to emphasize innovation and 
technology leadership. The emerging low-carbon economy will be 
powered by those countries that can take technological leadership. 
Those countries that are not able to take leadership will be followers, 
buying technology from those that have supported robust national, low-
carbon innovation systems. As China looks forward to mid-century and 
its near-term planning, it needs to invest in innovation, focusing on 
those technologies that are most strategic both for its own mitigation 
efforts and for global leadership in the low-carbon economy. 
Several promising technologies need further development or 
demonstration. Promising technologies that need further development 
and demonstration include hydrogen, biofuels, CCUS, nuclear power, 
and energy storage. Hydrogen and biofuels can be variously used in 
applications that are not amenable to electrification, such as long-
distance transport, air transport, chemicals, and high temperature 
heat. Hydrogen can also be used to manage the grid and provide 
storage capacity. Despite promising recent advances, efforts are 
needed to improve all elements of the hydrogen fuel cycle, from the 
generation of hydrogen, to storage, to fuel cells. Bioenergy energy from 
cellulosic feedstocks holds the promise of directly replacing liquid fossil 
fuels, but current technology is not competitive, and a range of broader 
concerns about impacts on agriculture and land use remain. China 
has a large underground storage capacity to potentially support CCUS 
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deployment, which would allow China to continue using fossil fuels in 
electricity generation and industrial applications. The use of bioenergy 
coupled with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) could deliver 
negative emissions – that is, sequester CO2 from the atmosphere – and 
offset CO2 emissions in hard-to-decarbonize sectors. Nuclear power 
remains a viable option for baseload electricity generation with current 
technologies, and advanced reactor designs and emerging technologies, 
such as small modular reactors, hold promise for a greater role in 
future electricity grids. Advances in energy storage would support 
enhanced grid flexibility, which will be particularly valuable in grids with 
high penetration of wind and solar power.
The era of Energy Internet (E-Energy) is providing opportunities 
in digitalization and electrification. Energy Internet—the fusion of 
information and communication technologies and energy systems—
is reshaping energy systems towards more flexible, smart, and 
efficient systems. Digitalization and electrification will serve as 
foundations for the energy systems of the future. The Energy Internet 
holds the promise of successfully integrating diverse elements of 
future electricity systems – variable renewable energy technologies, 
hydrogen, electric vehicles, and energy demand systems in buildings 
and other end uses – to create more efficient and resilient systems.  
Broad investments in science, technology, and innovation across 
the economy will support both decarbonization and broader 
technology leadership. Innovation and technology are crucial not only 
for China’s low-carbon transition. They are a foundation for long-term 
economic prosperity. Beyond the direct innovative opportunities in 
low-carbon technologies, a pathway towards science, technology, and 
innovation across the spectrum of key strategic areas of science and 
industries will accelerate China’s low-carbon transition. The Chinese 
government has been active in identifying priority areas, concentrating 
on high-tech fields as strategic pillar industries that promote an 
industrial transformation. A broad investment in science, technology, 
and innovation can deliver a win-win solution, supporting both the low-
carbon transition and broader economic growth.  
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4. SECTORAL 
STRATEGIES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES
Achieving China’s carbon neutrality goal will require a comprehensive, economy-
wide agenda for action. This will include efforts across key sectors, including 
electricity generation, buildings, industry, transportation, and the confluence of 
agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU). Each of these sectors presents 
its own challenges; each is associated with its own long-term requirements to 
support carbon neutrality; and actions today in each sector will be among the 
first essential steps toward meeting these requirements. Sectoral strategies can 
serve as an organizing framework for guiding action on mitigation.
A cross-cutting approach will be necessary to support successful mitigation. 
Many technologies will be implemented across sectors, and improvements to 
technology in one sector will support mitigation in others. For example, solar 
PV will be used in centralized electricity generation applications as well as in 
the buildings sector as distributed electricity generation. Batteries will support 
electrification of transport while simultaneously supporting electricity system 
operations and the integration of renewable electricity, and they may prove 
valuable for building energy management. Foundational technology areas such 
as digitalization will have implications across the energy system. 
Mitigation will also involve interactions between sectors. For example, using 
hydrogen in industry for high-temperature heat requires a transformation in 
hydrogen production, switching from natural gas to renewable sources as the 
primary input. Using biomass in industry or electric power will have implications 
for agriculture and land use, because of the interaction and potential competition 
between biomass production, agriculture, and afforestation or deforestation. 
Increased reliance on wind and solar power will lead to higher demand 
for industrial materials such as cement, steel, and glass, and will call for 
accelerated decarbonization of industry.
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Increased use of electricity will also strengthen inter-
sectoral linkages. Increased electrification in buildings, 
industry, and transport will accelerate the need for 
new electric power capacity. For example, electrifying 
transport can reduce tank-to-wheel vehicle emissions, 
but decarbonization of electric power will need to be 
tackled simultaneously with reductions in production 
and end-of-life vehicle emissions to achieve net system-
wide emission reductions. Meanwhile, the electricity 
system, with increasing shares of variable renewable 
energy, will need more flexibility and will require 
responsiveness in the end-use sectors.
Improving the coherence of policies and programs 
across ministries and sectors will be critical for 
China’s low-carbon transition. A successful transition 
will require a more mutually supportive policy mix 
within the energy system, as well as across energy, 
environmental, and agricultural sectors. It will require 
significant improvements in both vertical (national, 
provincial, and local) and horizontal (cross-ministerial) 
policy coordination. Cross-cutting policies such as 
carbon pricing may prove valuable as part of a policy 
portfolio. Similarly, technology is fundamental to the 
transformation that lies ahead and to China’s economic 
leadership in the new, green economy. Investments in 
technology innovation will therefore be an essential part 
of a strategy that can support action across sectors.
Cross-sectoral, cross-institutional coordination should 
go beyond the energy and environmental systems. 
Coordination needs to extend to fiscal and financial 
policies (see Chapter 5). China’s low-carbon transition 
requires a significant increase in investment in low-
carbon technologies and an immediate shift away from 
fossil energy investment to low-carbon investment. This 
changing investment landscape will require coordination 
between energy and financial policies, along with 
changes in fiscal policies, to align public investment 
with more ambitious climate targets.
BOX 4-1. USING SCENARIOS TO EXPLORE SECTORAL TRANSITIONS
While a broad set of scenarios were collected from modeling teams for 
this report, only subsets of those models are included in the various 
figures and numerical results describing the sectoral transitions in this 
section. Exploring sectoral transitions requires models with sufficient 
granularity to produce scenarios of key characteristics such as total 
energy, fuel mix, and sectoral CO2 emissions. Not all scenarios assessed 
in this report included sufficient granularity, and some scenarios are 
therefore excluded from comparisons. In addition, some scenarios did 
not provide sufficient data and some scenarios included insufficient 
sectoral coverage to be included in comparisons (e.g., representing 
only the residential component of the building sector). Finally, in some 
cases, scenario results were considered to be preliminary and not 
viable for comparison. The models that are assessed and described in 
each of the sectors varies based on these different factors.
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4.1 ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
TRANSITIONS
Current Status and Trends
China has the largest electricity sector in the world, 
with an installed capacity of 1900 GW and a total 
generation of around 7000 TWh (He et al., 2020a; 
CEC, 2019). China’s electricity demand has grown 
from 1,250 TWh in 2000 to 6,830 TWh in 2018 
(IEA, 2020b). Energy-intensive industries, such as 
steel, chemicals, and aluminum, have been the main 
driving force behind China’s rapid increase in electricity 
demand. However, the ongoing economic transition 
and structural shift towards service-based industries 
may make the role of service industries, residential 
consumption, and potentially transportation electricity 
consumption more prominent in the future (IEA, 
2019a; Lin et al., 2020). 
Along with the rapid growth in electricity demand and 
production, China’s CO2 emissions from electricity 
generation tripled between 2000 and 2017. Electricity 
production currently accounts for about 50% of 
energy-related CO2 emissions in China. China’s coal-
based power generation system is particularly carbon 
intensive, with a carbon intensity of 610g CO2/kWh, 
compared to 410g CO2/kWh in the U.S. and 270g CO2/
kWh in the European Union (IEA, 2020c).
China’s electricity generation is dominated by coal 
(Figure 4-1). More than 1,000 operating coal-fired 
power plants, a total of about 1,000 GW, provided 
64% of China’s electric power production in 2018 
(CEC, 2019). The majority of existing plants were 
installed after 2005 and therefore have a remaining 
design lifetime of decades. Early retirement of the large 
coal-based infrastructure would therefore create high 
risks of stranded assets. Meanwhile, the coal power 
industry is already facing financial challenges, largely 
from overcapacity and competition from increasingly 
competitive renewable generation. Installed coal 
capacity has been growing at a faster pace than coal 
power generation, meaning that coal plants are not 
being fully utilized. The average utilization of coal 
plants has dropped to below 50% (CEC, 2020), and, 
consequently, half of the existing plants are running at a 
financial loss.
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FIGURE 4-1. ELECTRICITY GENERATION BY TECHNOLOGY, 2007-2017. 
(Source: IEA, 2019c)
*　 According to UNEP and BENF (2020), renewable energy investment includes investment in the following sectors: wind, solar, biomass 
and waste, small hydro, geothermal, biofuels, and marine. Renewable electricity investment accounts for more than 95% of renewable energy 
investment.
Although non-hydro renewable energy currently makes 
up only a small percent of China’s electricity generation, 
China has become a global leader in the deployment 
of and investment in renewable energy. The installed 
wind power capacity grew significantly in the past four 
years, from 130 GW in 2015 to 210 GW in 2019, and 
the installed PV capacity increased almost five times 
during the same period, from 42 GW to 210 GW (CEC, 
2016, 2020). Currently, China’s installed wind power 
capacity accounts for a third of the total global capacity; 
PV capacity accounts for a fourth of the total global 
capacity. China has become the world’s largest investor 
in renewable energy* since 2013 and has contributed 
to around a third of the global total investment in 
renewable energy capacity (UNEP and BNEF, 2020). 
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Elements of Long-Term Strategy
Electricity emissions need to peak and start to decline 
immediately; they should be zero or negative by 
2050 to limit warming to 1.5°C. Rapid and deep 
decarbonization of the electricity sector has consistently 
been identified by research studies as a key strategy for 
limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the scenarios synthesized 
here, the electricity sector will need to be largely 
decarbonized by 2050 to limit warming to below 1.5°C; 
whereas in 2°C consistent pathways, electricity sector 
CO2 emissions need to be reduced by around 80-100% 
in 2050 (Figure 4-2).
BOX 4-2. ELECTRICITY: KEY ELEMENTS OF LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR CARBON NEUTRALITY
  ► Electricity emissions need to peak and start to decline 
immediately; they should be zero or negative by 2050. 
  ► Rapid electrification needs to occur in all end-use sectors; 
depending on the evolution of lifestyles, efficiency improvements, 
and technology options, electricity generation may grow by 120-
160% from current levels by 2050. 
  ► Conventional coal-fired power plants without CCUS need to be 
nearly phased out by 2040 or 2045. 
  ► Renewable power generation needs to increase significantly 
and will become the dominant source of electricity, contributing 
around 70% of generation by 2050. 
  ► CCUS and nuclear need to be retained as options to provide low-
carbon electricity, with actual contributions depending largely on 
the degree of policy support. 
  ► The flexibility of the power grid needs to be significantly improved 
through flexible generation, improved grid infrastructure, demand 
side response, and deployment of storage technologies to 
integrate high shares of variable renewable energy. 
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FIGURE 4-2. ELECTRICITY SECTOR CO2 EMISSIONS IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS.
Rapid electrification needs to occur in all end-use 
sectors. Electricity sector decarbonization will be 
accompanied by increasing demand for electricity driven 
by income growth, digitalization, and increasing use 
of electricity in industry, buildings, and transportation 
(see Box 4-3 and later chapters). Depending on the 
evolution of lifestyles, efficiency improvements, and 
technology options, electricity demand may vary to 
a great extent by 2050. In the scenarios synthesized 
here, electricity generation grows by 120-160% from 
current levels by 2050, reaching 15,000-18,000 TWh 
(Figure 4-4A). 
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BOX 4-3. THE IMPORTANCE OF ELECTRIFICATION IN LONG-TERM STRATEGY
Across research on deep decarbonization, electrification combined 
with decarbonization of the electricity sector has been identified as 
a key element of long-term strategy. Limiting warming to 1.5°C or 
2.0°C implies that electricity may become the dominant fuel in final 
energy consumption by 2050. Taking advantage of the most viable 
opportunities, the share of electricity in total final energy in China could 
increase from 22% in 2015 to 35-45% (1.5°C) and 35-40% (2°C) in 
2035 and 55-65% (1.5°C) and 45-55% (2°C) in 2050. Electrification will 
be driven by increasing energy services and shifting from fossil energy 
to electricity in all end-use sectors. In the industrial sector, industry 
processes that require low temperature heat can be electrified without 
fundamental changes to the system. In the buildings sector, increasing 
digitization and switching from fossil fuels-based to electric equipment 
will lead to gradual transitions. A transition to electric vehicles is a key 
strategy for the transportation sector, particularly in passenger road 
and rail transportation. Taking advantage of these opportunities, there 
could be around 50 million electric vehicles in China in 2030, providing 
a storage capacity of 3 billion kWh and a flexible load of nearly 500 
million kW. Total electricity demand might reach 15,000-18,000 TWh 
(1.5°C) and 12,000-16,000 (2°C) by 2050, depending on lifestyle and 
technology choices (Figure 4-4A).
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Rapid decarbonization and electrification have several 
implications for long-term electricity sector strategies. 
First, coal-fired power plants without CCUS need to 
be phased out before 2050 to limit warming to 1.5°C. 
In the scenarios synthesized here, conventional coal-
fired power generation not equipped with CCUS needs 
to be phased out by 2040-2045 to reach the 1.5°C 
goal and 2050-2055 for the 2.0°C goal (Figure 4-3). 
This phaseout can be achieved by halting construction 
of new coal-fired power plants without CCUS; rapidly 
retiring a small portion of old, dirty, inefficient plants; 
gradually reducing utilization of the majority of 
remaining plants; and implementing CCUS technology 
on viable existing and all new plants. Both the “no new 
coal” strategy and the rapid shutdown of “low-hanging 
fruit” plants are near-term actions that can deliver 
immediate economic and social benefits (see Box 3-2 in 
Chapter 3).
FIGURE 4-3. SHARE OF CONVENTIONAL COAL GENERATION (PANEL A) AND NON-FOSSIL GENERATION (PANEL B) IN CHINA’S POWER 
GENERATION IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS FROM SELECTED SCENARIOS. 
Note that Conventional coal only includes coal without CCUS. Non-fossil energy includes solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, nuclear, and biomass.
In the long run, to phase out China’s large and relatively 
young coal fleets, a viable path is needed to allow the 
majority of existing plants to operate over a minimum 
guaranteed lifetime but with gradually reduced 
utilization. This would reduce early retirements and, 
in doing so, reduce the risks of stranded assets. With 
decreased utilization, coal plants will transition from 
base load to peaking generation. Cui et al. (2020) 
finds that using this strategy, for 1.5°C pathways, 
the minimum guaranteed lifetime would need to be 
shortened to 20 years, and average utilization would 
need to be reduced from today’s 4,350 hours to 2,640 
hours in 2030, 1,680 hours in 2040, and zero hours 
2045. For 2.0°C pathways, the majority of existing coal 
plants can operate over a minimum of 30 years, while 
the average operating hours would need to be reduced 
to 3,750 hours in 2030, 2,500 hours in 2040, and 
below 1,000 hours in 2050.
The phaseout of conventional coal power generation 
will happen at different speeds in different provinces. 
Several provinces have specific near-term opportunities. 
Taking into account multiple technical, economic 
and environmental criteria, coal retirement can be 
implemented more rapidly in Shandong, Shanxi, and 
Inner Mongolia due to less favorable attributes of their 
coal plants (see Box 3-2). 
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As coal is being phased out, new investments will 
be needed in no-emissions generation technologies, 
with the non-fossil share reaching 80% or more of 
generation (Figure 4-3B). There are multiple zero-
emissions options, including wind power, solar power, 
nuclear power, fossil power with CCUS, and bioenergy 
with CCUS. Studies both on China and other countries 
do not provide a consensus on which approach might 
be best (Figure 4-4B), because of different perspectives 
on future costs and the viability of technologies, such as 
nuclear and fossil or bioenergy with CCUS, as well as 
perspectives about the ability to integrate high shares of 
wind and solar into the electric grid. 
Nonetheless, studies do generally agree that renewable 
power generation needs to increase significantly 
and will become the dominant source of electricity, 
contributing around 70% of electricity by 2050. 
In the 1.5°C scenarios synthesized here, renewable 
generation contributes 65% to 75% of generation by 
2050. In addition to climate and other environmental 
benefits, renewable energy uses domestic resources 
and therefore provides important energy security 
benefits. Solar and wind generation in total in 2035 
reach 4,000-5,900 TWh/year in the 1.5°C scenarios 
synthesized here, and they reach 2,500-4,200 TWh/
year in the 2°C scenarios. In terms of geographical 
distribution, He et al. (2020a) estimated that solar 
generation would be concentrated in northwestern 
provinces—Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, and Shaanxi—with 
more than 100 GW installed capacity in each by 2030, 
while wind capacities would be more evenly distributed, 
spreading across northwestern, northeastern, and 
coastal regions. By 2050, solar and wind generation 
provide 45-65% of total electricity generation in the 
1.5°C scenarios synthesized here, and they provide 30-
60% of electricity generation in 2°C scenarios. 
CCUS and nuclear need to be retained as options 
to provide low-carbon electricity, with actual 
contributions depending largely on the degree of policy 
support. Both nuclear power and fossil energy with 
CCUS can prove valuable complements to variable 
renewable power. The role of nuclear power will depend 
on factors such as infrastructure development, policy 
and public support, and institutional barriers to nuclear 
deployment (Yu et al., 2020a). In the 1.5°C scenarios 
synthesized here, nuclear electricity generation in 2050 
ranges from less than 2,000 TWh to over 4,000 TWh, 
and the fraction of nuclear electricity in total electricity 
generation in 2050 varies between 10% and 25% 
(Figure 4-4B). 
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FIGURE 4-4. TOTAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION (PANEL A) AND FRACTION OF DIFFERENT TECHNOLOGIES IN TOTAL ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS (PANEL B). 
Electricity generation by technology includes results from a subset of models that demonstrate how different generation technologies can be used to 
achieve high growth in electricity generation in 1.5°C consistent scenarios. 
CCUS is widely recognized as an important option for 
decarbonizing China’s electricity system because of 
China’s potentially large CO2 storage capability and 
its reliance on fossil generation (Yu et al., 2019). The 
availability of CCUS technologies carries important 
implications for energy transitions, particularly for the 
continued use of fossil fuels and slowing down coal 
retirements by at least a decade, which could alleviate 
stranded assets and a sudden transition of coal jobs. 
The f lexibi l i ty of the power gr id needs to be 
significantly improved through flexible generation, 
improved grid infrastructure, demand side response, 
and deployment of storage technologies to integrate 
high shares of variable renewable energy. Although the 
power system always had some ability to accommodate 
changes in supply and demand, power system flexibility 
is a much broader concept (Figure 4-5). It includes 
changes in grid infrastructure, demand-side response, 
electricity storage, and flexible operation of power 
plants. A well-functioning electricity market is also 
essential to managing contingencies and supporting grid 
flexibility.
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FIGURE 4-5. SOURCES OF POWER SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY. 
(Source: IEA, 2019a) 
Different levels of renewable integration require 
an evolving approach to improving power system 
flexibility. IEA has developed a phase categorization 
to capture changing impacts on the power system and 
resulting integration issues. At the national level, China 
is currently in Phase 2, while some provinces, such as 
Xinjiang, Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai are considered to 
be in Phase 3 (IEA, 2019a). 
Quick ramping electricity generation can add flexibility 
to the grid. Coal-fired power plants, when retrofitted, 
can provide flexible output. Hydroelectric plants and 
combined-cycle natural gas plants can also provide 
a significant degree of flexibility, but their roles might 
be limited. Meanwhile, encouraging power plants to 
operate as balancing load rather than baseload would 
require carefully designed transition mechanisms, as 
these power plants would face higher costs and lower 
revenues. 
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BOX 4-4. THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET IN ACHIEVING GRID FLEXIBILITY 
Reforming the electricity market and setting correct price signals are 
crucial for flexibility. An efficient market setup will significantly lower 
costs and optimize system efficiency, provide economic incentives for 
flexible demand and storage options, and ensure efficient integration 
of seasonable hydro and variable renewable energy. A recent IEA study 
has shown that implementing market-based dispatch and expanding 
regional transmission interconnectivity in China could reduce annual 
operational costs by 15% or $63 billion and decrease power sector CO2 
emissions up to 750 Mt in 2035 (IEA, 2019a).
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Improved transmission and distribution infrastructure 
can also increase grid flexibility. Increasing regional 
interconnectivity, such as building ultra-high-voltage 
transmission lines, allows electricity to be transported 
within a larger balancing area, not only providing better 
balance variability but also allowing for more efficient 
generation. Creating a networked distribution grid also 
increases the value of distributed renewable energy 
(Aggarwal and Orvis, 2016). Studies estimated that the 
interregional transmission capacity could be expanded 
to around 300 GW by 2030 and 500 GW by 2050 (Li 
et al., 2016; SGERI, 2018), and this might be further 
increased with higher variable renewable energy in 1.5°C 
and 2°C consistent pathways. Moreover, several studies 
noted that transmission lines connecting Northwest and 
Central grid regions and lines connecting Northwest 
and East grid regions have the highest transmission 
capacities, and the Northwest region emerges as a 
national supplier of low-carbon electricity (Li et al., 
2016; SGERI, 2018; He et al., 2020a).
Digitalization opens up new options to balance 
electricity supply and demand, and demand response 
becomes a powerful approach for increasing grid 
flexibility. The availability of real-time monitoring 
systems with bidirectional communication across grids, 
loads, and generation is critical and could be enabled 
by improved digitalization and connectivity in end-use 
sectors.  For example, dynamic electric vehicle charging 
adapts the charging cycle to both the conditions of the 
power system and the needs of users and optimizes 
the charging process according to distribution grid 
constraints, availability of local energy resources, and 
users’ preferences (IRENA, 2019a). Smart thermostats, 
appliances, and controls in buildings are also useful 
demand response tools. An important element of 
demand response is an effective market design, which 
allows demand response to participate in all wholesale 
markets (see the discussion on electricity market reform 
below). 
Energy storage can also provide flexibility on the 
grid. Grid-scale batteries can support short-term 
contingencies, while pumped hydro and compressed 
air systems provide long-term storage options. Use of 
synthetic fuels and hydrogen is also a viable option for 
seasonal storage when there are high shares of variable 
renewable energy in electricity generation.
The power system transition and grid flexibility require 
coordination not only within the power system, but 
also across different systems. With high shares of 
renewables, there is an increasing need to improve 
coordination between generation, transmission, and 
distribution planning processes. Increased grid flexibility 
also encourages broader energy system integration 
and opens synergies with developments in the end-use 
sectors (e.g. the deployment of electric vehicles and 
smart building technologies). 
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Near-Term Challenges, Opportunities, and Actions
Stop new construction of coal-fired power plants 
without CCUS. The coal power industry has been 
financially troubled in recent years. Due to overcapacity 
and competition from renewables, coal plants in China 
on average were running at 4,290 hours (below 50% 
of their full capacity) in 2019 (CEC, 2020), and over 
half are operating at a loss (Bodnar et al., 2020). At 
the same time, the current project pipeline includes 
about 100 GW of new projects under construction 
and another 50 GW permitted (Global Energy Monitor, 
2020), indicating that China’s total installed coal 
capacity is likely to continue to grow during the 14th 
Five-Year Plan. 
Continued coal builds will only exacerbate the financial 
strain within the industry. New builds will further lower 
BOX 4-5. DECARBONIZING POWER, ENERGY SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The benefits of decarbonizing the power sector extend well beyond 
climate mitigation. Growth in low-cost solar and wind energy resources, 
along with electrification of the energy system, will increase energy 
independence, reduce long-term exposure to fuel price volatility, and 
improve access and affordability to electricity. Moreover, renewable 
energy generation is more resilient to changes in market conditions. 
Coal power generation was hit most significantly during the COVID-19 
crisis in almost all world regions (IEA, 2020b; EIA, 2020). In China, while 
the total power generation in the first quarter of 2020 dropped 6.8% 
from a year earlier, thermal power generation dropped by 8.2% (Xu 
and Singh, 2020).
New employment opportunities from a decarbonizing power sector 
can boost local economies. These clean-energy jobs are higher quality 
compared to coal jobs and often in less developed areas and rural 
communities, creating new opportunities for underserved communities 
(Muro et al., 2019).   
At the same time, it is also true that decarbonization of the power 
system will significantly reduce coal-related jobs in China. Coal 
mining and washing accounted for around 3.2 million jobs in 2018 and 
some regions with high concentrations of coal-related jobs, such as 
Shanxi Province, will be disproportionately affected (He et al., 2020b). 
Measures have been taken by other countries, including setting a 
transition timeline to help local industries plan early, establishing just 
transition funds to finance the transition, creating employee transfer 
programs with on-the-job retraining, enhancing local infrastructure 
investment, and developing social programs that provide assistance 
with education and relocation (Bridle et al., 2017; Sartor, 2018).
The transition from coal generation to renewable generation could also 
lend impetus to China’s economic growth. China is a global leader in 
manufacturing, as well as in innovation and deployment of renewable 
energy technologies, placing it at the forefront of the global energy 
transition. It accounted for around 30% ($83.4 billion) of the global 
renewable energy investment in 2019 (UNEP and BNEF, 2020). China 
is also leading in renewable energy patents, with 29% of the global 
total in 2016, followed by the U.S., EU, and Japan (IRENA, 2019b). Low-
carbon transition in the power sector could help maintain China’s global 
leadership in clean energy.
BOX 4-6. ELECTRICITY: NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO SUPPORT A LONG-TERM TRANSITION
  ► Stop new construction of coal-fired power plants without CCUS. 
  ► Identify and quickly close a small fraction of the existing coal 
plants that are old, dirty and inefficient.
  ► Continue to increase the share of non-fossil generation (around 
45% by 2025).
  ► Establish electricity spot markets.
  ► Increase interprovincial trade on green electricity through power 
market reform.
  ► Enhance CCUS policies to promote CCUS-ready in new fossil fuel 
plants and/or CCUS retrofit in existing facilities
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the utilization of all coal plants and undermine their 
financial viability. Moreover, continuing to install new 
coal-fired power plants while simultaneously attempting 
to meet the long-term carbon neutrality goal will 
result in premature retirement of these newly added 
plants, accelerate the phaseout of existing plants, lock 
in energy infrastructure, and substantially increase 
stranded assets and the costs of achieving the long-
term carbon neutrality goal. Taking immediate actions 
to stop new construction of coal plants is an effective 
and beneficial near-term approach that should be 
considered during the 14th Five-Year Plan.
Identify and quickly close a small fraction of the 
existing coal plants that are old, dirty and inefficient. 
A total of 38 GW of small, old, inefficient plants were 
shut down during 2015-2018 (CEC, 2016, 2017, 
2018, 2019) to combat local air pollution and address 
overcapacity. Specific targets and action plans are 
being made across individual provinces to continue 
retiring obsolete plants through the end of 2020. Such 
a process should continue in the 14th Five-Year Plan 
to identify low-hanging fruit plants based on technical, 
economic and environmental criteria and develop 
retirement targets and plans. Rapidly shutting down 
these small, old, dirty, and inefficient plants is not only 
an essential part of a well-structured coal transition 
plan, it has the potential to deliver co-benefits on air 
quality, public health, and other societal objectives in 
the near-term.
Continue to increase the share of non-fossil generation. 
With no new coal plant construction and a rapid 
shutdown of inefficient coal plants, the share of non-
fossil fuels in electricity generation needs to rapidly 
increase in the near term. About 33% of total electricity 
currently comes from non-fossil energy sources. In the 
1.5°C scenarios synthesized here, this share increases 
to 40-50% by 2025, to 50-60% by 2030, and to 
60%-80% by 2035 (Figure 4-3B). 
The integration of non-fossil generation will require 
efforts to improve the integration of renewables into 
the grid. In particular, market-based dispatch and 
inter-provincial transmission can help prioritize low-
cost renewable electricity generation, increase clean 
energy supply from renewable rich regions, and 
incentivize investments in renewable capacity. Instead 
of building new fossil (gas or coal) plants for quick 
ramping generation, retrofitting existing coal plants 
with improved flexibility can potentially help support 
renewable integration in the near term. A total of 220 
GW coal plants were planned to be retrofitted with 
improved flexibility during the 13th Five-Year Plan; 
however, only a quarter of the target has been reached 
by 2020 (Yuan et al., 2020). 
Establish electricity spot markets. Creating an 
effective electricity market is critical to high penetration 
of variable renewable energy and grid flexibility. 
Establishing electricity spot markets is one of the major 
components needed to improve market rules and 
system operation. International experience has shown 
that a well-functioning, short-term electricity market is 
essential to drive power system transformation (IEA, 
2019a). It reveals real electricity prices at different 
times and locations, which can inform long-term 
electricity pricing, guide investment in new generation 
capacity, and help with the establishment of financial 
markets for electricity. A liquid spot market with well-
designed rules also allows for market entry of new 
actors, such as storage and demand aggregators, which 
are critical to demand side response and grid flexibility.
China is trying to move from an equal allocation 
dispatch system to a market-based dispatch system. 
Currently, there are eight provincial-level electricity 
spot market pi lots underway, which can help 
regulators understand the impact of different market 
designs responding to different regional challenges 
and resources mix. The design of spot markets needs 
to address several challenges, including potential 
resistance from generators, local governments, and 
other stakeholders, appropriate rules to reward right 
behaviors and penalize noncompliance, and revenue 
changes of existing generators.
Increase interprovincial trade on green electricity 
through power market reform. Combining well-designed 
spot markets with better utilization of interconnections 
and improved grid investment can significantly improve 
power system efficiency and flexibility and allow for 
high shares of variable renewable energy from wind and 
solar power. Although China currently has inter-regional 
mid- and long-term trading, this practice is not fully 
adopted. Significant efforts are needed to harmonize 
various markets, improve market coordination, and 
encourage broad participation by both state-owned and 
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private generators (IEA, 2019a). 
Enhance CCUS policies to promote CCUS-ready in 
new fossil fuel plants and/or CCUS retrofit in existing 
facilities. Although there are uncertainties around wide 
deployment of CCUS, CCUS remains an important 
option for net zero emission systems. Given China’s 
coal-based energy system, CCUS retrofits could 
help lower the risks of stranded assets by reducing 
premature retirements of existing fossil plants. When 
combined with bioenergy, CCUS can generate negative 
emissions, offsetting emissions that are difficult to 
mitigate, such as from air travel or high-temperature 
heat. Although a broad range of issues and challenges 
surround the use of bioenergy with CCUS, many of 
which are associated with the production of bioenergy 
crops, it is important to maintain multiple options for 
decarbonizing electricity and potentially creating net-
negative emissions. Despite the potential for CCUS in 
the Chinese power sector, investments in CCUS are 
unlikely to happen without explicit policy support. 
R&D and pilot projects are needed to move forward on 
pilot projects to advance the technology and create the 
option to apply CCUS more broadly. In addition, near-
term CCUS policies can focus on promoting CCUS-
ready in all new fossil fuel plants and identifying the 
appropriate features for existing plants’ CCUS retrofit. 
The electricity sector transition will require coordinated 
efforts across the entire value chain of electricity 
product ion and consumpt ion.  I t  wi l l  improve 
coordination between electricity sector policies and 
policies for buildings, transportation, and industry. 
Rapid electrification in end-use sectors not only drives 
electricity demand, it also provides opportunities for 
better demand side response and a more flexible power 
system. 
4.2 BUILDINGS SECTOR TRANSITIONS
Current Status and Trends
Energy use in buildings includes both operational 
energy use—the energy used to operate the building—
as well as embodied energy—the energy consumed 
for manufacturing building materials such as cement 
and steel. Building operational energy consumption—
final energy consumption—has been growing rapidly in 
the past decade. Final energy use in Chinese buildings 
grew 2.3% annually between 2005 and 2018. Total 
final energy use was 630 Mtce in 2018, larger than 
the total energy consumption of all end-use sectors in 
Japan and the UK combined in that year (IEA, 2020d). 
Embodied energy use in buildings is about half as large 
as operational energy use in terms of primary energy, 
using the substitution accounting method (THUBERC, 
2019).
Urban residential, rural residential, commercial, and 
space heating in northern urban China respectively 
account for 17%, 38%, 20% and 25% of the total 
operational energy of all buildings in China in 2017 
(Figure 4-6). Electrification is about 47% for urban 
residentials, 59% for commercials, 9.7% for rural 
residentials, and 3.3% for space heating in northern 
urban China respectively. Self-collected biomass 
constitutes 30% of energy use in rural buildings. District 
space heating dominates space heating in northern 
urban China, providing heat for 85% of total floor space 
in this region—that is about 15 billion m2—in 2018. 
The current heat source mix in this region is about 50% 
by coal combined-heat-power (CHP) plants, 3% by gas 
CHP plants, 35% by coal heat plants, and 12% by gas 
heat plants (in terms of heated floor space) (THUBERC, 
2019). Around one-third of district space heating in 
China is based on coal heat plants. 
From 2008-2017, energy intensity (operational only) 
increased 28% (from 214 to 273 MJ/m2) for urban 
buildings excluding district space heating, 5.0% (from 
346 to 363 MJ/m2) for rural buildings, and 20% 
(from 586 to 703 MJ/m2) for commercial buildings 
excluding district space heating. The only application in 
which energy intensity decreased was space heating in 
northern urban China, where energy intensity decreased 
17% (from about 527 to 440 MJ/m2). This decrease 
of energy intensity was primarily due to better building 
envelopes and the deployment of more efficient district 
heating plants in the past years (THUBERC, 2019).
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FIGURE 4-6. FINAL (“OPERATIONAL”) ENERGY USE IN THE BUILDINGS SECTOR. 
Final energy use for urban residential and commercial buildings excludes the energy use for space heating in northern urban China. (Source: THUBERC, 2019) 
Energy consumption in China’s building sector has been 
driven by continued urbanization, economic growth, 
increasing digitalization, and a transition towards a 
service-based economy. Income growth and a rising 
middle class resulting from robust economic growth 
have led to improved standards of living and increased 
service demands in buildings. Increasing digitalization 
is also reshaping energy use in buildings. People 
are staying longer at home because of convenient 
online shopping, and more people are working from 
home. Online retail sales in China increased by about 
16.5% in 2019 (NBS, 2020). Moreover, China’s 
ongoing transition to a service-based economy requires 
the construction of more complex and large-scale 
commercial buildings, which has driven the fast growth 
in energy use in commercial buildings in the past 
decade.
The total buildings stock in China was 60 billion m2 in 
2018, comprised of 24 billion m2 of urban residential 
buildings, 23 billion m2 of rural residential buildings, 
and 13 billion m2 of commercial buildings (THUBERC, 
2020). Urbanization is a continuing dynamic in China 
that will have important implications for building 
sector decarbonization strategies. According to the 
UNDESA (2019), China is expected to experience 
rapid urbanization, from 61% of the population 
currently to 80% in 2050. Continued urbanization 
will close the gap in service demands between rural 
and urban households and potentially lead to higher 
energy consumption in buildings. Currently, there is a 
significant ownership gap in certain energy intensive 
household appliances between urban and rural China. 
For example, the number of air-conditioning units and 
water heaters per 100 households are 53 and 63 in 
rural areas, respectively, while they are 129 and 91 
units in urban areas (NBS, 2019). 
Space heating 
in northern 
urban China
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There are two significant features relating to China’s 
building stock dynamics during the past several years 
(Figure 4-7). First, the Chinese building stock has 
grown dramatically in recent years. The construction 
boom has led to around 2.5 bil l ion m2 of new 
floorspace per year, on average, since 2011, resulting 
in a 17% increase in the total stock. This is equivalent 
to constructing Japan’s total building floorspace every 
three to four years (Yashiro, 2009). The construction 
boom has roots in the Chinese government’s long-held 
preference for viewing real estate development as one 
of the main drivers of economic growth. Second, in 
addition to construction, China continues to demolish a 
substantial fraction of the existing building stock every 
year. China demolished around 1.5 billion m2 in 2018, 
or 2.5% of the total stock at that time. As a result, 
the average lifetime of Chinese buildings is only about 
25-30 years, much less than that in most developed 
countries (usually more than 50 years).  
FIGURE 4-7. BUILDING STOCK DYNAMICS FROM 2006-2018. 
(Source: THUBERC, 2020)
Even with the dramatic growth in China’s building 
stock, China’s per capita floor space significantly lags 
behind that of developed countries. In 2017, the 
average per capita floor space in China was around 34 
m2 for residential buildings (about 31 m2 in urban and 
38 m2 in rural), and 9 m2 for commercial buildings 
(Wang, 2018). China’s residential floorspace was about 
85% of that in Japan and about 60% of that in the 
United States; China’s commercial floorspace was about 
65% of that in Japan and about 35% of that in the 
United States. Were China to maintain its current pace 
of construction and demolition—about 1.1 m2/capita 
of floorspace growth annually on balance, two-thirds in 
residential buildings and the remainder in commercial 
buildings—it is estimated that China’s per capita floor 
space would reach Japan’s current level by 2035 and 
the current U.S. level by 2055 or 2060.
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Elements of Long-Term Strategy
Emissions need to peak immediately and should be 
reduced by about 90% by 2050 relative to 2015. 
In most of the scenarios synthesized here that limit 
warming to 1.5°C, direct emissions of CO2 from the 
Chinese buildings peak immediately and decline. 
For these scenarios, emissions decline 50%-95% by 
2050 relative to 2015 levels (Figure 4-8). Associated 
with these emissions reductions, China will need to 
constrain its energy demand growth. In most of the 
1.5°C scenarios synthesized here, building final energy 
consumption in 2050 is either near today's levels or 
well above today's levels. This range of future outcomes 
represents different perspectives on the countervailing 
forces of improved efficiency, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, increased urbanization and demands 
for building energy services in an increasingly affluent 
society (Figure 4-9).
BOX 4-7. BUILDINGS: KEY ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR CARBON NEUTRALITY
  ► Emissions need to peak immediately and should be reduced by 
about 90% in 2050 relative to 2015.
  ► Around 75% of buildings energy use should be supplied by 
electricity by 2050.
  ► Most district heating systems in northern urban China need to be 
decarbonized by 2050.
  ► Reduce embodied energy in buildings by extending building 
lifetimes through retrofits and/or using higher-quality building 
materials.
  ► Control the overall scale of building stock while continuing to 
improve living standards.  
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FIGURE 4-8. BUILDINGS SECTOR DIRECT CO2 EMISSIONS IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
This chart does not include scenarios that do not reach 50% CO2 reductions by 2050 in 1.5°C. CBEM was excluded from this chart due to different accounting on CO2 emissions. There is no 1.5°C 
scenario from the POLES-JRC model.
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FIGURE 4-9. FINAL ENERGY USE IN CHINESE BUILDINGS IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS.  
FIGURE 4-10. BUILDINGS SECTOR’S ELECTRIFICATION IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS.  
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Around 75% of buildings energy use should be 
supplied by electricity by 2050. The 1.5°C scenarios 
synthesized here articulate two levels of electrification. 
At the high end, scenarios include 75-85% electricity 
in final energy; at the low end, scenarios include 55-
65% electricity in final energy (Figure 4-10). The main 
difference between these two perspectives lies in the 
projected amount of use of heat and gas in the future. 
The “low electrification” scenarios suggest that heat 
and gas will account for about 30% of the final energy 
use in the buildings sector; the “high electrification” 
scenarios suggest heat and gas will account for only 
around 15%. Achieving higher electrification implies 
using electricity for space heating, cooking and water 
heating in buildings. In the “high electricity” scenarios, 
electricity use in Chinese buildings increases from 1,450 
TWh in 2015 to about 3,650-5,000 TWh in 2050 in 
1.5°C scenarios, implying an annual increase of 2.7% 
to 3.6%. 
Most district heating systems in northern urban China 
need to be decarbonized by 2050. District space 
heating can be viewed as involving four components: 
the source of the heat, the pipeline network, the 
heating system within buildings using the heat, and the 
envelope of buildings and their thermal characteristics. 
Opportunities for saving energy from the latter three 
have been well-studied. They include, for example, 
improved insulation of pipelines, appropriately 
sizing water pumps, improved system operation and 
adjustment to avoid an uneven distribution of heat 
across the system (leading to overheating in some 
parts of the system), and higher energy performance 
of building envelopes. Long-term strategy needs to 
focus on decarbonizing heat sources for district heating 
in northern urban China. There are two main options 
to decarbonize heat sources in district heating: using 
electric heat pumps for space heating, which would 
also increase electrification of the building sector, and 
adopting waste heat from industrial factories and coal or 
nuclear power plants in regions where this opportunity 
is available. Of the two options, adopting waste heat is 
more economical and should be given a higher priority. 
China has rich waste heat resources from industrial 
processing facilities and from thermal power plants. In 
2018, the total floor space with district space heating 
in urban areas in northern China was about 12 billion 
m2, and district space heating consumed about 5 billion 
GJ of heat. It has been estimated that low-temperature 
waste heat from industrial facilities, coal power plants, 
and nuclear power plants in northern China are about 
0.8, 7.8 and 2.6 billion GJ/year, respectively. Studies 
show that the feasible utilization rate of such waste 
heat may be around 20-40% (THUBERC, 2019). If 
only 15% of the waste heat could be used, it would 
provide about 1.7 billion GJ/year, which would reduce 
space heating energy consumption in northern urban 
China by about one-third.
Reduce embodied energy in buildings by extending 
building lifetimes through retrofits and/or using higher-
quality building materials. Retrofitting buildings 
consumes much less energy than constructing new 
ones. In addition, the use of high-quality building 
materials (e.g., high-quality cement) can avoid early 
demolition. The demolition rate in China is currently 
about 2.5%. In contrast, the U.S. rate is about 0.3% 
to 0.5% for residential buildings (EIA, 2018). If the 
annual demolition rate in China could be reduced to 
1% (implying reducing 0.9 billion m2 new buildings 
per year), overall buildings sector CO2 emissions 
(including the indirect CO2 emissions from embodied 
energy consumption) could be reduced by about 
11%. Decarbonizing building material manufacturing 
processes (e.g., using more renewable electricity and 
hydrogen as heat source) will also help to reduce CO2 
emissions related to embodied energy consumption (See 
Chapter 4.3).
Control the overall scale of building stock while 
continuing to improve living standards. In addition to 
extending building lifetimes, controlling the overall scale 
of China’s building stock is essential, in the long run, 
for decarbonizing the sector’s embodied and operational 
energy use. As noted above, per capita floor space in 
China may reach the level of developed countries within 
the next two to three decades (e.g., Japan, Europe, 
US). Given China’s population, an increase in per capita 
floor space to the U.S. level may significantly impede 
China’s pursuit of sustainable development, particularly 
in terms of energy consumption and land use. 
Therefore, planning a reasonable long-term building 
stock development pathway (i.e., setting up a stock 
cap) may be essential for China to achieve climate 
neutrality before 2060. However, controlling the total 
building stock should not hinder housing affordability 
for low-income families. Governments need to consider 
developing social housing for certain affected social 
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groups if the “stock cap” policy is implemented.
Building strategies will need to be coordinated with 
those of other sectors. Electrification in the buildings 
sector is supported by decarbonization of the power 
sector. In order for buildings to function as soft load 
takers of grid electricity, it will be necessary to integrate 
smart building-integrated PV (BIVP) systems and 
electric vehicle charging stations into building energy 
systems. This requires holistic policy design between 
the power, transportation, and building sectors. 
Additionally, changes in building lifetimes and the 
total building stock, as well as building materials and 
construction practices, could affect the demands and 
production processes of industrial products, particularly 
products such as cement and glass. These linkages 
emphasize the need for cross-sectoral policies and 
strategies. 
Near-Term Challenges, Opportunities, and Actions
Continue to enhance building design standards for 
energy efficiency by improving requirements, including 
electrification, and renewable energy integration. 
Currently, China has five sets of national building design 
standards for energy efficiency (also called building 
energy codes), three for the residential buildings in 
different climate zones (i.e., JGJ 26, JGJ 75 and JGJ 
134), one for rural residential buildings (i.e., GB/T 
50824) and one for commercial buildings (i.e., GB 
50189). These codes are tightened from time to time to 
reflect the advance of relevant technologies, particularly 
on the adoption of better wall insulation, higher energy 
performance windows and more efficient district space 
heating systems. In the future, the stringency of these 
codes needs to be improved, and the coverage of 
these codes also needs to be broadened to facilitate 
electrification and renewable integration. 
Continue to improve Energy Efficiency Standards and 
Labeling schemes of appliances to incorporate smart-
enabling technologies and address system energy 
savings opportunities. The existing energy efficiency 
standards and labeling (EES&L) schemes have covered 
many key energy use appliances in buildings, including 
air-conditioner, TVs, washing machines, lamps, chillers, 
copy machines, fans, printers, water heaters, range 
hood, and electromagnetic stoves. These regulatory 
EES&L schemes need to be further improved to 
address more system energy savings opportunities by 
incorporating smart-enabling technologies, such as 
information feedback function of appliances, optimal 
stand-by modes of appliances, and improved efficiency 
under non-full load.
Phase out coal use in rural residential buildings by 
promoting onsite PV and efficient biomass use. The 
short-term decarbonization strategies for the rural 
residential buildings in China lie in improving the onsite 
renewable energy use, such as PV and biomass, and 
using them in place of coal. The main energy carriers 
for rural households are coal, biomass, and electricity. 
Coal and biomass are used for cooking, space heating, 
BOX 4-8. BUILDINGS: NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO SUPPORT A LONG-TERM TRANSITION
  ► Continue to enhance building design standards for energy 
efficiency by improving requirements, including electrification, 
and renewable energy integration.
  ► Continue to improve Energy Efficiency Standards and Labeling 
schemes of appl iances to incorporate smart-enabl ing 
technologies and address system energy savings opportunities.
  ► Phase out coal use in rural residential buildings by promoting 
onsite PV and efficient biomass use.
  ► Encourage the use of passive technologies, such as natural 
ventilation and lighting, by developing small-sized commercial 
buildings and reducing the focus on large-size commercial 
buildings.
  ► Deploy smart technologies in order to improve demand side 
response and grid flexibility.
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and water heating. Rural households in China currently 
consume about 90 Mtce of self-collected biomass every 
year (about 30% of the energy use in rural households). 
In order to decarbonize rural residential energy use, 
three key measures need to be taken: developing onsite 
PV on the substantial roof and courtyard floor space 
in rural China; processing self-collected biomass into 
compacted shapes or converting them into biogas in 
order to improve the energy efficiency of biomass use; 
and replacing on-site coal use by electricity, biogas, 
or compacted shape biomass. It is estimated that the 
available floor space in rural China for installing PV 
is about 15 billion m2 (THUBERC, 2019). This area 
could host about 1500 GW of PV and provide at least 
2,000 TWh of electricity. In 2017, the final energy 
use in Chinese rural residential buildings was about 
2,400 TWh (including 0.262 billion tce of heat and 
229 TWh of electricity). That is to say, the electricity 
generated from potential onsite PV in rural China could 
meet about 80% of the energy needs of Chinese rural 
households.
Encourage the use of passive technologies, such as 
natural ventilation and lighting, by developing small-
sized commercial buildings and reducing the focus 
on large-size commercial buildings. The high overall 
energy intensity of China’s commercial buildings is due 
in large part to the proportion of large-size buildings 
in the commercial building stock. The energy intensity 
of large-size commercial buildings (e.g., larger than 
40 thousand m2 in terms of floorspace) is typically 
30-100% higher than that of small-size ones, due to 
factors such as the need for more artificial lighting, 
mechanical ventilation, large pumps, and extensive use 
of elevators (THUBERC, 2019). Small-size commercial 
buildings have lower internal heat gains, therefore 
requiring less space cooling, and they use natural 
lighting and ventilation more effectively. In this sense, 
they can provide a healthier built environment. It is 
therefore important to consider regulatory or economic 
policies to encourage the development of small-size 
commercial buildings rather than large-size ones, 
particularly in the non-first-tier cities.  
Deploy smart technologies in order to improve demand 
side response and grid flexibility Continuing advances 
in efficient, smart technologies and onsite renewables 
are changing how electricity is supplied to and used in 
buildings. Buildings not only act as shock absorbers for 
the grid, but they also provide new services. Innovative 
policies are needed to tap these opportunities (see Box 
4-9). Accelerating the deployment of technologies such 
as smart sensors, meters, appliances, and distributed 
generation will make it easier to balance electricity 
demand in a seamless, automated fashion. Moreover, 
to fully realize this potential, market reforms are needed 
to allow building owners and operators to access the 
electricity market and obtain economic gains from 
energy savings and electricity trades. 
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BOX 4-9. BUILDINGS AS GRID SHOCK ABSORBERS
To further improve the energy efficiency of high-power and low-power 
appliances/equipment in buildings (e.g., elevators, pumps, fans, air-
conditioners, and refrigerators), an emerging trend is to adopt DC 
motors instead of AC motors, to realize convenient speed control. 
Other appliances, such as LED lamps, PCs, and displayers, already 
use DC power. It is feasible and beneficial to adopt DC type micro-
grids within buildings by converting grid electricity from AC to DC to 
supply electricity for buildings. Such a shift could make buildings good 
shock absorbers when combined with building integrated PV (BIPV) and 
smart electric vehicle charging stations. Developing BIPV could largely 
facilitate the onsite use of PV in urban China, where low-rise and high-
rise buildings dominate. Additionally, the stock of electric vehicles in 
China is increasing rapidly, so there is a growing demand for electric 
vehicle charging stations. The combination of these three “blocks” could 
allow buildings to act as soft load takers for the electric grid, and even 
act as additional electricity providers in certain periods. A pilot project 
is now being implemented in the city of Shenzhen, China.
BOX 4-10. MITIGATING HOUSEHOLD AIR POLLUTION BY REPLACING SOLID FUELS FOR COOKING AND SPACE HEATING IN RURAL CHINA
Solid fuels like coal and raw biomass still account for about 80% 
of energy use in rural China, mainly for cooking and space heating 
(THUBERC, 2016). These solid fuels are not burned efficiently due to 
the use of inefficient space heating appliances and cooking stoves. 
Consumption of these fuels results in significant indoor air pollution. 
It has been reported that the household air pollution from space 
heating has caused about 0.67 million premature deaths and 14.0 
million disability-adjusted life years in rural China (Chen et al., 2018a). 
Replacing solid fuels with electricity (e.g., onsite PV or wind turbines) 
and gas (e.g., biogas) for cooking and space heating in Chinese rural 
residential buildings, particularly in provinces in western, central and 
northeastern China, could not only help reduce CO2 emissions, but also 
reduce the significant negative health effects on occupants, mostly the 
elderly, women, and children.   
BOX 4-11. REDUCING NON-CO2 EMISSIONS FROM BUILDINGS THROUGH LOW-GWP REFRIGERANTS
China’s GHG emissions from the HFCs are expected to increase 
substantially, driven by increasing demands for cooling services 
and the phase-out of CFCs and HCFCs. HFCs emissions (R410a) from 
room air-conditioners in China increased from 9.2 tonnes in 2006 
to 12,000 tonnes in 2017 (SN-CMA, 2020). Even with full compliance 
with the Kigali Amendment, it is estimated that the cumulative HFCs 
emission from room air conditioners in China from 2018 to 2050 will 
still be about 1.6 million tonnes, or the equivalent of around 3.2 Gt CO2 
(SN-CMA, 2020). Low Global Warming Potential (GWP) refrigerants, 
particularly refrigerants such as propane (R-290) for air conditioners 
and isobutene (R-600a) for domestic refrigeration, could substantially 
reduce GHG emissions. The use of these refrigerants can also save 
electricity. It has been estimated that switching to R-290 can save 
about 1.6% of electricity used for space cooling compared to the 
current popular refrigerant R-410A (Purohit et al., 2018).
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4.3 INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Current Status and Trends
Over the past decade, China's output of major industrial 
products has continued to grow rapidly. Electrolytic 
aluminum production more than doubled and crude 
steel production grew nearly 60%. China produced 
more than half of global cement (57%), crude steel 
(51%), electrolytic aluminum (56%) and a significant 
share of other industrial products (e.g., more than a 
third of global ammonia) in 2018. China’s industrial 
sector contributed 41% of China’s total GDP in 2017, 
but it consumed 65% of the country's total final energy 
(NBS, 2019) and was responsible for 68% of energy-
related CO2 emissions (IEA, 2019b).
FIGURE 4-11. CHANGES IN CHINA'S OUTPUT OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS AND ITS SHARE IN WORLD PRODUCTION. 
(Sources: NBS, 2019; Wang, 2020a)
Sustainable development of China's industry faces many 
challenges. China's industrial output growth remains 
overly dependent on resource and energy inputs. 
Its energy consumption per unit of industrial value-
added is 5 to 8 times higher than that of developed 
countries (ERI, 2020). China has become the world's 
largest importer and consumer of bulk products such 
as iron ore, crude oil, bauxite and even coal (BP, 
2020). China is increasingly dependent on external 
input sources, and associated economic security risks 
are rising. Excess capacity is another major challenge. 
Low utilization of its production capacity could affect 
investment returns and capital gains, which in turn 
could lead to systemic financial risks. As the largest 
source of air pollutants such as sulphur dioxide (90%), 
nitrogen oxides (69%), and dust (78%), industry is 
facing great pressure to control air pollution (MEE, 
2018). China’s industry is deeply integrated into global 
supply chains, and the 2020 pandemic could reduce 
globalization and reshape these global supply chains. 
With China already accounting for a substantial share of 
global industrial products, a post-pandemic economic 
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recovery plan without well-designed policy and well-
guided investment has the potential to exacerbate 
China's excess industrial capacity, exacerbate the 
structural problems it faces, lock the industrial sector 
into inefficient and outdated production, and increase 
the difficulty of a long-term transition consistent with 
China’s vision of growth and development.
Domestically, the demand for China's major industrial 
products is expected to continue to grow in the near 
term and remain robust well into the future, in order 
to meet continuing infrastructure construction needs 
associated with China’s comprehensive modernization 
targets (Figure 4-12). China's continued urbanization 
implies a significant requirement for new and upgraded 
infrastructure and that demand for basic industrial 
products will remain high for several decades. 
In order to achieve China's 2050 comprehensive 
modernization targets, China's industrial value added 
needs to quadruple by 2050. Following a traditional 
growth model, industrial output, energy consumption, 
and carbon emissions will nearly double. The precise 
character of China’s future industrial development 
cannot be known with certainty, due to uncertain 
changes in the future demand structure. Yet several 
robust insights do emerge from the studies. Demand for 
crude steel and cement are expected to remain stable 
after relatively quickly reaching a peak, while demand 
for the main petrochemical products and electrolytic 
aluminum will continue to increase. 
FIGURE 4-12. CHINA'S FUTURE DEMAND FOR MAJOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS THROUGH 2050. 
Due to different definitions, the assumptions of the different scenarios regarding China's demand for industrial goods in 2050 vary considerably. The PECE_LIU_2019 scenario, cited here, depicts a 
continued rise in China's industrial goods, after which they stabilize and then ultimately begin to decline. (Source: Liu et al., 2019c)
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Elements of Long-Term Strategy
CO2 emissions need to peak immediately and decline 
by around 90% relative to 2015 levels by 2050. A 
low-carbon transformation of China’s industrial sector 
is essential to promote China's high-quality economic 
development, maintain economic, financial and energy 
security, protect the environment and control carbon 
emissions. In addition, due to its share of global 
production, energy consumption, and emissions, as well 
as its position in the global industrial chain, the low-
carbon transition of China’s industry will reshape the 
global supply chain. Industrial sector CO2 emissions 
must decline rapidly to reach carbon neutrality before 
2060. An immediate peak in emissions will lay the 
foundation for a national peak well before 2030 and 
for limiting cumulative CO2 emissions (Lugovoy et al., 
2018; Zhou et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019b). In the 
1.5°C scenarios synthesized in this report, industrial 
CO2 emissions peak immediately and decline at an 
average annual rate of between about 2.5% and 3.2%. 
In contrast, in 2°C scenarios, they decrease at an 
average annual rate of between about 1.8% and 2.7%. 
By 2050, industrial CO2 emissions are 75% to 95% 
lower than 2015 levels in 1.5°C scenarios.
BOX 4-12. KEY ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR CARBON NEUTRALITY
  ► CO2 emissions peak immediately and decline by around 90% 
relative to 2015 levels by 2050.
  ► Building a modernized industrial sector will  accelerate 
industrial digitalization and restructure manufacturing sectors, 
constraining the overall scale of industrial energy demands and 
reducing carbon intensity. 
  ► Energy efficiency improvements, material substitution, and 
circular economy will lead to reduced energy demand.
  ► Industry electrification continues to increase due digital 
transformation and switching from fossil fuels to electricity for 
low temperature heat.
  ► Switching fossil fuels to zero-carbon hydrogen or biomass in 
industrial processes and high-temperature heat production.
  ► Applying CCUS to exhaust gases in applications with high CO2 
concentrations.
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FIGURE 4-13. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR CO2 EMISSIONS IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Because models have different definitions of what falls within the industrial sector, base-year numbers vary substantially between models, as shown in the left panel. For consistent comparison of 
trends, relative changes across models can be used, as shown in the bottom two panels.
Building a modernized industrial sector will accelerate 
industrial digitalization and restructure manufacturing 
sectors, constraining the overall scale of industrial 
energy demands and reducing carbon intensity. The 
future scale and character of China’s industrial energy 
demands will depend on modernization of China’s 
industrial sector. A transition toward high value-
added industries and shift from manufacturing-based 
to service-based industries will lower energy intensity 
and help to constrain energy demands. Through the 
development of producer services, the construction 
of a service-oriented manufacturing industry, the 
optimization and upgrading of industrial internal 
structure, and the promotion of service industries, 
the total added value per industry output can be 
increased substantially, leading to a rapid decline in 
carbon intensity. A new round of industrial revolution 
is also characterized by intelligence, digitalization 
and networking. Accelerating the deep integration of 
informatization and industrialization, deploying new-
generation information technologies such as cloud 
computing, big data, blockchain, Internet of Things 
(IOT), 5G, and other new technologies in the industrial 
sector can improve productivity from a systems 
perspective and bring additional energy efficiency 
benefits.
Energy efficiency improvements, material substitution, 
and circular economy will lead to reduced energy 
demand. A broad range of technology options to 
improve energy efficiency can be found across the 
industrial sector, from more efficient motors to more 
efficient means of generating process heat. More 
broadly, a transition to a circular economy, focused on 
reducing, reusing and recycling materials, will interact 
with industry modernization and lead to different means 
of production and material substitution, both of which 
raise opportunities for increased efficiency.
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Reflecting the broad possibilities for industrial sector 
evolution, scenarios articulate a wide range of different 
levels of future energy demands. All the 1.5°C scenarios 
synthesized in this study lead to decreased energy 
demands by 2050, yet the pathways are different 
and the overall level of reduction is different. In some 
of the scenarios synthesized in this study, industrial 
final energy consumption decreases by 2% to 11% in 
2050 relative to 2015; while other scenarios indicate 
the possibility of reducing industrial final energy 
consumption by almost 30% (27% to 28%) compared 
to 2015. The timing of when industrial energy demand 
will peak also varies across models, from immediately 
in some models to as late as 2030 in one model.
FIGURE 4-14. INDUSTRIAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 1.5°C SCENARIOS 
Because models have different definitions of what falls within the industrial sector, the base-year numbers vary substantially between models, as shown in the left panel. For consistent comparison 
of trends, relative changes across models can be used, as shown on the right.
1.5°C
2020 2030 2040 2050
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Year
Fi
na
l e
ne
rg
y 
us
e 
in
 in
du
st
ry
 (
M
tc
e/
yr
)
1.5°C Normalized
2020 2030 2040 2050
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
Year
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 (
20
15
=
1) DPEC
ERI−Industry
ERI−LEAP
GCAM−China
IPAC−AIM/technology
MESSAGEix−GLOBIOM
PECE V2.0
PECE_LIU_2019
58SYNTHESIS REPORT 2020 ON CHINA’S CARBON NEUTRALITY
BOX 4-13. SCENARIOS OF DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
The traditional development model for China’s industry is not supported 
by the potential for continued growth in global markets, materials 
and resources availability, or carbon neutrality goals. In order to 
address these multiple limits on China’s traditional development 
model, China's industrial sector must follow a low-carbon transition by 
improving energy efficiency, optimizing energy structure, increasing 
recycled materials use, and applying CCUS, hydrogen, and other new 
technologies on the premise of maintaining a large scale of products 
and value-added. Given the many uncertainties that surround future 
industrial development and future markets for industrial products, 
multiple industrial decarbonization pathways are possible, and different 
scenarios illustrate these different pathways.
Scenarios from the PECE_LIU_2019 model and the ERI-Industry model 
demonstrate the relative contributions to decarbonization that could be 
expected from different measures. In the PECE_LIU_2019 model, from 
a business-as-usual scenario—a scenario assuming no explicit efforts 
to reduce emissions—to the 2°C scenario, 53% of the decarbonization 
comes from energy efficiency improvement, 32% from changes in the 
energy mix, 4% from the adjustment of industrial structure, and 10% 
from the application of CCUS. Additional emission reductions to limit 
warming to 1.5°C mainly come from continued improvements in energy 
efficiency and substitution toward hydrogen. Hydrogen contributes 
33% of the additional decarbonization. The ERI-Industry scenario 
explores decarbonization starting from China’s NDC. From the NDC 
scenario to the 2°C scenario, emissions reductions similarly come 
from industrial structure, energy efficiency, energy structure, end-
demand management and CCUS applications. From 2°C to 1.5°C, 24% of 
the additional emission reduction comes from the further application of 
CCUS, and 76% comes from substituting to hydrogen. Both scenarios 
show that low-carbon technologies such as CCUS and hydrogen will be 
crucial for decarbonization of the industrial sector, but that different 
combinations are possible.
FIGURE 1. MITIGATION CONTRIBUTIONS BY MEASURES IN 2050 IN TWO ILLUSTRATIVE 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Decarbonization of the industrial sector will alter the composition of 
the fuels that the industrial sector consumes. Different scenarios also 
demonstrate significant differences in the final energy structure of the 
industrial sector in 2050, when limiting temperature change to 1.5°C. 
For example, the industrial sector in PECE_LIU_2019 is more dependent 
on accelerated electrification to replace fossil energy. In contrast, 
in the scenario from MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, alternative substitutes for 
fossil energy such as bioenergy, play a larger role.
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Industry electrification continues to increase, due 
to digital transformation and switching from fossil 
fuels to electricity for low temperature heat. In 
the 1.5°C scenario synthesized in this study, the 
industrial electrification rate rises from 23% in 2015 
to anywhere from 45% to 80% in 2050. Examples of 
opportunities for electrification in the industrial sector 
include switching from blast furnaces to electric arc 
furnaces in steel production and using electricity for low 
temperature heat in most manufacturing sectors.
Switching from fossil fuels to zero-carbon hydrogen or 
biomass in industrial processes and high-temperature 
heat production. Accelerating green hydrogen (produced 
from zero-carbon electricity) and sustainable biomass 
deployment as new energy carriers and feedstock will 
play a crucial role in reducing emissions in applications 
where it will be difficult to use electricity. Hydrogen 
has the potential to serve as an efficient, clean, and 
flexible secondary energy source, and will play an 
important role in the deep decarbonization of the 
industrial sector. In the 1.5°C scenarios synthesized 
here, hydrogen accounts for 3% to 18% of final energy 
in 2050, and biomass accounts for around 5%. It is 
therefore important to develop demonstration projects 
of green hydrogen production and sustainable biomass 
production, and integration with industries such as 
petrochemicals and iron and steel to promote the 
necessary RD&D and reduce long-term costs.
FIGURE 2. INDUSTRIAL FINAL ENERGY STRUCTURE FROM TWO ILLUSTRATIVE 1.5°C SCENARIOS.
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FIGURE 4-15. ELECTRICITY, HYDROGEN, AND BIOMASS PERCENTAGES IN INDUSTRIAL FINAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN 1.5°C 
SCENARIOS. 
Only two scenarios included biomass results up through 2050. For PECE V2.0, distributed solar are treated separately from final electricity that would impact the share of electricity in final energy.
Applying CCUS to exhaust gases in applications with 
high CO2 concentrations. China is endowed with a 
relatively large underground storage capability. CCUS 
could be applied both in electricity generation and in 
industrial applications with high CO2 concentrations, 
such as iron and steel, cement, and chemicals. The 
use of CCUS would allow the industrial sector to retain 
a certain amount of fossil energy consumption to meet 
the demand for high-grade heat sources for specific 
processes without increasing CO2 emissions. CCUS 
could also be used in production of hydrogen produced 
from bioenergy, which would result in negative 
emissions. 
Electricity Hydrogen Biomass
2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050
2%
4%
6%
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Year
S
ha
re
 o
f i
nd
us
tr
y 
fin
al
 e
ne
rg
y
DPEC
ERI−LEAP
GCAM−China
IPAC−AIM/technology
MESSAGEix−GLOBIOM
PECE V2.0
PECE_LIU_2019
61 CHINA’S NEW GROWTH PATHWAY: FROM THE 14TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO CARBON NEUTRALITY
BOX 4-14. WHY DO WE NEED INTEGRATED, CROSS-SECTORAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS? IMPACT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
GENERATION ON INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS AND CARBON EMISSIONS IN CHINA
Renewable power is expected to be a cornerstone of China’s 
decarbonization strategy, as it is throughout much of the world. The 
construction, installation, and maintenance of wind and solar power, 
however, consume large quantities of industrial materials. The main 
industrial materials consumed in wind turbine construction are 
concrete, steel, and iron. PV modules require galvanized iron, glass, 
copper, and aluminum. One study (Wang et al., 2020b) suggests that, to 
limit warming to 2°C, production of wind turbines in China in the next 
30 years could consume 650 million tons of concrete, 170 million tons 
of steel, and 40 million tons of iron during 2020-2050. PV production 
in China could consume 400 million tons of galvanized iron, 340 
million tons of glass, 330 million tons of copper and 170 million tons of 
aluminum over this same time period. 
FIGURE 1. INCREASE IN MAJOR INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS DUE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN A 2°C 
SCENARIO (WANG ET AL., 2020B). 
The “BAU” scenario assumes no additional mitigation actions are taken and that industry follows recent trends. In the “Under 2°C scenario”, wind power and PV electricity generation expand 
substantially consistent with limiting warming to 2°C. The “2°C plus scenario” assumes additional technological innovation of the industrial sector while still limiting warming to 2°C: the 
industrial sector reduces the material demand and associated carbon emissions in the construction of wind and PV through energy-saving technologies.
These increased materials demands will call for associated industrial 
sector mitigation. Under the same 2°C scenario, the demand for 
industrial materials brought by increased deployment of wind and 
solar power will cumulatively generate 6.6 billion tons of CO2 by 2050, 
increasing industrial emissions by 11% over the same period. If the 
industrial sector's own technological progress is considered (2°C 
plus scenario in Figure 2), the cumulative emissions from the above-
mentioned industrial materials may be reduced to 5.2 billion tons. The 
study finds that these increases in the demand for industrial materials 
for wind and solar deployment will not impact the feasibility of limiting 
warming to 2°C, but they could prove more challenging for limiting 
warming to 1.5°C. 
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Near-Term Challenges, Opportunities, and Actions
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, the industrial 
sector will face challenges associated with the impulse 
to expand, low industrial concentration, excess 
capacity, a high proportion of energy-consuming 
products, low value-added of products, low energy 
efficiency, and uneven regional distribution. The 14th 
Five-Year Plan will be a period of significant changes 
in China’s economic structure, especially its demand 
structure. When adapting to changes in the overall 
economic situation and responding to these challenges, 
China's industrial sector will also be presented with 
significant opportunities to upgrade and transform. 
A low-carbon transition in China’s industrial sector 
will comprehensively increase industrial total factor 
productivity (TFP), change production methods, 
cultivate new business models, achieve structural 
optimization, and lay a solid foundation for long-term 
high-quality development.
BOX 4-15. INDUSTRY: NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO SUPPORT A LONG-TERM TRANSITION
  ► Further remove excess capacity, increase concentration, and 
optimize industry structure in order to improve efficiency and 
increase innovation. 
  ► Improve the relevant processes and standards of environmental 
impact assessment and energy technology assessment to guide 
investment and to control capacity expansion in high energy 
consuming industries. 
  ► Implement demand management measures to control the output 
of industrial products and lower total energy demand.
  ► Prioritize energy efficient technology deployment to control total 
energy demand.
  ► Increase electrification, particularly to replace coal consumption.
FIGURE 2. CO2 EMISSIONS EMBODIED IN INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS DUE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY IN A 2°C 
SCENARIO. 
(Wang et al., 2020b) The “BAU” scenario assumes no additional mitigation actions are taken and that industry follows recent trends. In the “Under 2°C scenario”, wind power and PV 
electricity generation expand substantially consistent with limiting warming to 2°C. The “2°C plus scenario” assumes additional technological innovation of the industrial sector while still 
limiting warming to 2°C: the industrial sector reduces the material demand and associated carbon emissions in the construction of wind and PV through energy-saving technologies.
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Further remove excess capacity, increase concen-
tration, and optimize industrial structure in order to 
improve efficiency and increase innovation. Excess 
capacity is one of the biggest challenges to a near-
term industrial transition. In order to effectively remove 
excess capacity, it will be necessary to change the 
government's approach to engaging in the market 
and to promote the establishment of a market-based 
mechanism. A market mechanism could determine the 
price and allocation of factors of production based on 
corporate competitiveness, thereby eliminating back-
ward production capacity. A "green yardstick" should 
also be established for "removing excess capacity", 
taking energy efficiency, environmental protection, 
safety, quality, and other factors into consideration, and 
combining them with industry development. Through all 
of these measures, the goal is to achieve an increase in 
the rate of overall capacity utilization of more than 5% 
in the major industrial sectors during the 14th Five-Year 
Plan period.
Improve the relevant systems and standards of 
environmental impact assessment and energy tech-
nology assessment to guide investment and to strictly 
control capacity expansion in high energy-consuming 
industries. China is a vast country, with different levels 
of economic development in the east, middle and west 
regions, and different industrial structures, layouts and 
technology levels. High energy-consuming industries 
are still attractive to the central and western regions. 
It is important to improve the relevant systems and 
standards of environmental impact assessment and 
energy technology assessment currently implemented 
in China in order to guide the investment and control 
the expansion of high energy consuming industries 
across regions. When formulating the post-pandemic 
stimulus plan, it will also be necessary to control the 
further expansion of industrial production capacity. To 
address the issue of excess capacity, the goal is that the 
total capacity of major industrial sectors will no longer 
increase during the 14th Five-Year Plan period.
Implement demand management measures to control 
the output of industrial products and lower total energy 
demand. Measures to avoid demolition and reconstruc-
tion, prolong the current lifetime of infrastructure to 50 
to 100 years, plan for reasonable levels of total building 
floor space, and develop a circular economy to increase 
the recycling and reuse of resources could reduce the 
demand for materials significantly without sacrificing 
people’s consumption. Limiting the export of energy 
intensive products will also lower the demand for indus-
trial output. Through demand management measures, 
the goal is that the output of industrial products such 
as crude steel and cement will peak before 2025, and 
the growth of the output of industrial products such as 
chemicals and electrolytic aluminum will be effectively 
controlled. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, it is 
recommended to set a cap on CO2 emissions in the iron 
and steel and cement sectors which can be effectively 
included in the national carbon market of China.
Prioritize energy efficient technology deployment to 
control total energy demand in the industrial sector. 
While China is at the cutting-edge of efficiency in some 
energy-intensive industries, such as aluminum, in 
others, such as steel, cement, ethylene, flat glass, and 
caustic soda, the energy consumption per unit of output 
product of the more advanced producers internationally 
is 10% to 30% lower than that of China (CCEEE, 
2019). Utilizing the energy saving potential of existing 
technologies is the most cost-effective way to reduce 
emissions. There are still many opportunities to improve 
energy efficiency in a cost-effective way by utilizing 
current existing technologies during the 14th Five-Year 
Plan period. To maximize near-term energy savings 
potential, it is therefore important to highlight the 
importance, overcome the difficulties and challenges, 
and accelerate the application of mature technologies 
and equipment in key energy-consuming enterprises. 
First, improve the energy efficiency of key enterprises 
and products, and promote energy conservation from 
partial and individual energy conservation to process- 
and system-wide energy conservation. Second, promote 
green upgrades and energy efficiency improvements 
of key energy-consuming equipment such as boilers, 
motors, and transformers. Finally, accelerate the 
application of digitalization and information technology 
in the field of energy conservation. The goal is to 
improve overall industrial energy efficiency by more 
than 15%, and to have most industrial energy efficiency 
indicators reach the international advanced level during 
the 14th Five-Year Plan period.
Increase electrification, particularly to replace coal 
consumption. Increasing electrification is the intrinsic 
requirement for modernizing industr y, and, in 
combination with decarbonization of the power sector, 
64SYNTHESIS REPORT 2020 ON CHINA’S CARBON NEUTRALITY
is important for the industrial sector’s early peaking. 
There are several steps that need to be taken. Promote 
innovation in industrial methods and realize the 
synergistic advancement of industrial electrification and 
digitalization and intelligence. Replace traditional 
production processes with advanced electricity-using 
production processes to meet the production needs of 
products of higher specif ications. Promote the 
development of electric heating so that low temperature 
heat can be provided by electric heat pumps. Finally, 
improve market mechanisms to support industrial 
electrification, for example, further improving peak and 
valley prices, differential prices, and tiered price policies 
according to the scale, time distribution, and electricity-
consuming efficiency of industrial enterprises. The goal 
is to increase the overall industrial electrification rate 
around 5% during the 14th Five-Year Plan.
4.4 TRANSPORTATION SECTOR TRANSITIONS 
Current Status and Trends 
As a key enabler of economic activity and social 
connectivity, transportation energy consumption 
and CO2 emissions have grown rapidly in China. 
Transportation now represents almost 12% of total 
Chinese final energy consumption. CO2 emissions 
from the transportation sector have risen from about 
400 MtCO2/yr in 2005 to around 1.1 billion tons/yr in 
2018 and now account for almost 11% of total China’s 
energy-related CO2 emissions. Road transport is the 
biggest emitter in the transportation sector, representing 
77% of energy-related CO2 emissions in 2018 (Figure 
4-16). Transportation relies almost exclusively on liquid 
fossil fuels.
BOX 4-16. INDUSTRIAL DECARBONIZATION AND CHINA’S LONG-TERM GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Integrating industrial low-carbon transformation with broader growth 
and development goals will help build consensus, overcome obstacles, 
and help China’s industrial sector better position itself in the overall 
growth and development strategy. The low-carbon transformation of 
China's industry requires the deep integration of traditional industries 
with intelligent, digital, and network technologies to better integrate 
with the service sectors and give birth to new industrial sub-sectors. A 
future industrial sector that has achieved a low-carbon transition will 
better meet the needs of other economic sectors and people’s desires 
for higher-quality industrial products, and promote high-quality 
development of the overall Chinese economy. 
A low-carbon industrial sector will rely more heavily on hydrogen 
and biomass, reducing dependence on traditional fossil energy. The 
availability of higher-quality industrial products means that the 
demand for infrastructure in the process of urbanization will be met 
with higher standards, and the durability and energy efficiency of 
the infrastructure will also be greatly improved. All upgrades in the 
industrial sector will help improve overall energy efficiency, energy 
security, and environmental protection.
In addition, due to its share of global production, energy consumption, 
and emissions, as well as its position in the global supply chain, a low-
carbon transformation of China’s industry will also reshape the global 
supply chain, spurring the low-carbon transformation of global 
industry.
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FIGURE 4-16. ENERGY-RELATED CO2 EMISSIONS AND SHARES OF TRANSPORT ENERGY DEMAND BY MODE IN 2018. 
(Source: CATS,2020)
Driven by China’s rapid urbanization and industrializa-
tion, demand for transport services has been increasing 
rapidly. Freight transport activity (in tonne-km) and 
passenger transport activity (in passenger-km) increased 
by 172% and 310%, respectively, between 2005 and 
2019. Urban passenger transport activity increased 
10 times between 2005-2019. In 2019, the share of 
public transport and private automobiles accounted for 
above 38% and 30% of urban passenger transport, 
respectively (CATS, 2020).
The structure of transportation and the distribution of 
modes play an important role in transportation energy 
consumption and emissions. In freight transport, China 
is facing the challenge of shifting from road transport 
to less carbon-intensive modes. The share of road 
transport in freight transport grew from 76% to 88% 
between 2005 and 2019. This was largely driven 
by transport of coal, iron ore, grain, and other bulk 
commodities. 
Passenger transport activity has gradually shifted from 
road to rail, as a result of the rapid expansion of the 
high-speed railway network. Road passenger activity 
peaked at 1100 billion passenger-km/yr in 2014, then 
decreased to 880 billion passenger-km/yr in 2019. It 
accounted for 30% of all passenger transport in 2019. 
China’s rail passenger transport has maintained a stable 
rate of increase and reached 1470 passenger-km/yr in 
2019, or about 48% of passenger transport. China has 
the world’s longest high-speed railway network and its 
extensive use has replaced part of the conventional rail 
activity. The proportion of electric rail reached 72% in 
2019, increasing from 42% in 2005. China’s stock of 
new energy vehicles, currently 3.8 million, is the world’ 
largest, accounting for 1.5% of its total vehicles. (Chen 
et al., 2018b; NBS, 2019)
High-quality development and green transformation of 
the transportation sector has been a national strategy 
to strengthen the construction of an “Ecological 
Civilization” and “Beautiful China”. The “Outline of 
Building China into a Powerful Transportation Country”, 
issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council in September of 2019, puts forward the goal 
of "building a safe, convenient, efficient, green and 
economical modern comprehensive transportation 
system", and regards "green development, economical 
and intensive,  low-carbon and envi ronmental 
protection" as the strategic focus of future transportation 
development. Considering medium- and long-term 
trends, the transportation sector urgently needs to 
promote energy conservation and emission reduction in 
road freight, and to promote the electrification of and 
transformation to new and clean energy in urban public 
transport, urban logistics, and distribution vehicles.
However, China's low-carbon transformation in 
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transportation faces a number of challenges. One 
challenge is poor transportation structure and low 
transportation efficiency. A considerable proportion of 
long-distance, bulk cargo transportation takes place 
by road, which has higher energy consumption and 
emissions. A second challenge is that some areas 
of transportation development raise ecological and 
environmental issues that have not been resolved. 
Total GHG emissions in transportation continue to 
rise. Finally, there is room for significant improvement 
in green transportation governance capabilities and 
monitoring and evaluation assessment systems.
Looking to the future, China's transportation system 
may be reshaped by emerging technologies and new 
modes of working and living, which may have a positive 
impact on transportation decarbonization. Passenger 
and freight transportation demands will continue to 
evolve in the face of emerging technologies, changes in 
commercial patterns, and changing human behaviors, 
such as remote offices, online banking, online shopping, 
shared cars, autonomous driving, drone technology, 
E-commerce, and 3D printing. Large-scale application 
of electric vehicles, intelligent trains, self-driving 
cars, and intelligent ships are likely to revolutionize 
transport infrastructure design and operations. The 
Chinese government is exploring green fuel substitution 
in aviation. With the application of advanced internal 
combustion engine technologies and new materials, 
energy-saving and new energy vehicles are becoming 
increasingly popular. In addition, urban traff ic 
infrastructure is gradually evolving, due to strategic 
spatial planning featuring multi-center, small-block, and 
mixed-function models. 
Elements of Long-Term Strategy 
Transportation CO2 emissions peak between 2025 
and 2035 and then decline around 80% by 2050 
relative to 2015. In 2°C scenarios, emissions peak 
around 2030 for most models. Emissions in 2050 
are 25%-65% lower than 2015 levels (Figure 4-17). 
The variation between scenarios arises from different 
assumptions about future transport services, due, in 
large part, to differences in assumptions about future 
economic and social development, differences in 
options for energy efficiency, and differences in the mix 
of technologies that will be implemented to decarbonize 
the transportation sector.
BOX 4-17. TRANSPORTATION: KEY ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR CARBON NEUTRALITY
  ► Transportation CO2 emissions peak between 2025 and 2035 and 
then decline by around 80% by 2050 relative to 2015.
  ► Trans i t ion  to  low-carbon energy sources across the 
transportation sector, including electricity, sustainable biofuels, 
and hydrogen.
  ► A shift to greater energy efficiency and low-carbon transport 
modes through comprehensive transportation planning. 
  ► Increased integration of innovative technologies, such as big 
data, 5G, artificial intelligence, blockchain, supercomputers with 
infrastructure and vehicles to build an electrified, smart, and 
shared transportation system.
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FIGURE 4-17. TRANSPORTATION SECTOR CO2 EMISSIONS IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Differences in base-year numbers result from differences in calibration methods, scope and definition of the transportation sector, and historical data sources. For example, scenarios from models 
which incorporate emissions from international shipping and aviation might generally be higher than scenarios from models which exclude these emissions. For consistent comparison of trends, 
relative changes across models can be used, as shown in the bottom two panels. Differences in accounting methods can also have implications for future emissions due to differences in the ability to 
reduce emissions in particular sectors.
The future of transportation is uncertain, and different 
models articulate different visions of transportation 
sector change and potential pathways for decarboniza-
tion (Figure 4-18). For example, the scenarios from the 
IPAC model assume high future service demand, with 
3 times growth from 2015 to 2050. The scenario from 
the Transportation-CATS model, in contrast, assumes a 
flat future service demand trend. 
In the freight sector, the scenario from the Trans-
portation-CATS model assumes that freight demand 
continues to grow slowly through 2030. From 2030 to 
2040, industrial output growth slow, further reducing 
the growth rate in freight service demand. After 2040, 
freight transportation peaks and maintains a slow 
downward trend. The Transportation-CATS scenario 
assumes that China's demand for heavy and bulk freight 
transportation will peak before 2030. After 2030, fol-
lowing the completion of the urbanization process and 
infrastructure construction, bulk freight transportation 
will decline. After that, it will remain relatively stable. 
The scenario assumes that road transport will remain 
the most important mode of freight transportation. 
With the implementation of an ambitious low-carbon 
transportation policy, a portion of the demand for road 
freight will be transferred to railways and waterways. 
With the promotion of multimodal container transport, 
railway and waterway cargo transportation will have 
greater potential for growth. Freight transport in air and 
pipelines will increase, but will remain a relatively low 
proportion of overall freight transport. 
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It is important to note that the scope of freight 
transportation within models can affect the scenarios 
they produce. For example, GCAM-China and IPAC 
models both include freight from international shipping 
and aviation, and both models expect to see an increase 
in these sectors. The Transportation-CATS model, in 
contrast, considers only domestic shipping and aviation 
services.
The three scenarios illustrate three different trends in 
passenger transport. In the IPAC scenario, passenger 
transportation continues to rapidly increase, with an 
aggregate growth of 400% between 2015 and 2050. 
In the GCAM-China scenario, activity rises more slowly, 
at an aggregate rate of 130%. In the Transportation-
CATS scenario, activity increases 4%/yr before peaking 
in 2040, at which point it declines at about1%/yr. 
The Transportation-CATS scenario assumes that 
the slowdown of urbanization rate after 2030 will 
significantly influence passenger transport demand. 
It assumes that China will remain in the transition 
period of industrialization and urbanization until 2030 
and that China's urbanization gradually matures from 
2030 to 2050, leading to a slowdown in passenger 
transportation demand. In this scenario, civil aviation 
has the fastest growth rate, followed by railway 
transportation. In urban travel, people tend to favor 
private cars because they are faster, more comfortable, 
and more convenient, and there is more freedom to 
choose routes. In the future, the development of new 
technologies and modes such as autonomous driving 
and shared cars will make car travel more attractive. 
Different types of cities will experience different trends 
in public transport. Demand for public transport in 
urban areas with low population densities will decline 
further. 
FIGURE 4-18. NORMALIZED PROJECTIONS OF TRANSPORTATION SECTOR ACTIVITY (IN TONNE-KM FOR FREIGHT AND IN PASSENGER-
KM FOR PASSENGER) IN THREE 1.5°C SCENARIOS.
Transition to low-carbon energy sources across the 
transportation sector, including electricity, sustainable 
biofuels, and hydrogen. A primary means of reducing 
transportation CO2 emissions will be to switch from 
liquid fossil fuels to alternative fuels with lower carbon 
footprints. All the 1.5°C scenarios synthesized here 
include transitions to electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels. 
Yet the mix of low-carbon fuels differs among scenarios, 
reflecting uncertainty about how technology will 
develop and which technologies will ultimately prove 
most effective in different applications (Figure 4-19). 
Across the 1.5°C scenarios synthesized here, electricity 
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supplies 25%-50% of transportation energy by 2050. 
As an example, the PECE_LIU scenario has a relatively 
low electrification rate of 35%, but it has a higher share 
of biofuels and hydrogen. In this scenario the total share 
of electricity, hydrogen, and biofuels in 2050 accounts 
for above 80% of total freight energy consumption 
(electricity 20%, hydrogen 20%, and biofuels 40%). 
The share of low-carbon fuels in passenger energy 
consumption is also above 80% (electricity 51%, 
biofuels 31%). The Transportation-CATS scenario 
has the highest 2050 electrification rate among the 
scenarios (50%), with a correspondingly lower share of 
hydrogen and biofuels. By 2050, the share of electricity, 
hydrogen, and biofuels in freight transportation energy 
demand are 45%, 3%, and 1% respectively, and their 
shares in passenger transportation energy demand 
are 65%, 4%, and 8%. New energy vehicles account 
for more than 80% of all vehicles, new energy ships 
account for more than 50% of all ships, and biomass 
energy and other new energy sources are used for 90% 
of civil aviation.
FIGURE 4-19. ELECTRICITY PERCENTAGE IN TOTAL TRANSPORTATION ENERGY CONSUMPTION (PANEL A) AND TWO ILLUSTRATIVE 
SCENARIOS OF ENERGY DEMAND AND FUEL MIX IN THE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR (PANEL B).
A shift to greater energy efficiency and low-carbon 
transport modes through comprehensive transportation 
planning. Accelerating the development of green 
transportation modes such as water transportation and 
railway will maximize structural emission reductions. 
Structural adjustments of various modes of freight 
transportation takes advantage of the comparative 
advantages of railway and waterway transportation, 
allowing these modes to meet an increasing proportion 
of the demand for freight, reduce energy demand, 
and reduce carbon emissions. High-speed rail can 
gradually support a higher proportion of inter-city travel, 
increasing its overall efficiency.
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Increased integration of innovative technologies, such 
as big data, 5G, artificial intelligence, blockchain, 
supercomputers with infrastructure and traffic vehicles 
t o  bu i l d  an  e l ec t r i f i ed ,  smar t ,  and  sha red 
transportation system. Broad technology trends are 
having effects across the Chinese economy. Future, low-
carbon energy systems will integrate transportation 
infrastructure networks, transportation service networks, 
energy networks, and information networks, creating a 
ubiquitous and advanced transportation information 
infrastructure. Important transitions include: building a 
comprehensive transportation big data center system 
and deepening the development of transportation public 
services and e-government; applying the BeiDou 
sate l l i te  nav igat ion sys tem to  t ranspor ta t ion 
applications; applying driverless technology in different 
types of vehicles, such as buses, fire engines, logistics 
vehicles, taxis, smart highways, unmanned ferries in 
scenic spots, and cleaning vehicles; developing 
business models such as time-sharing leasing, network-
based car rental, and comprehensive travel services for 
new energy vehicles to meet future personalized travel 
needs. As an example, in the Transportation-CATS 
scenario, automated driving represents more than 80% 
of all vehicles by 2050, and smart ships and smart 
docks represent more than 90% of these systems.
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BOX 4-18 : HOW ELECTRIC VEHICLES WOULD RESHAPE THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TRANSPORTATION AND POWER SECTOR.
In 2019, the number of electric vehicles nationwide reached 3.1 million. 
Related supporting infrastructure has developed rapidly – 7600 
charging piles had been built in 810 expressway service areas by 2019 
(MOT, 2020). The popularization and application of new energy vehicles 
are prominent, particularly in public buses and trams. Among the 
693,000 public buses in China in 2019, there were more than 410,000 
new energy buses, accounting for more than 58% of all buses (MOT, 
2020). In July 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission 
issued the “Opinions on Innovating and Perfecting the Price Mechanism 
for Promoting Green Development”, which proposed encouraging 
electric vehicles in order to provide energy storage services and 
obtain benefits through peak-trough electricity price differences. 
With continuing breakthroughs in batteries, related technologies, and 
charging pile construction and standard setting, integrating electric 
vehicles into power systems is a cross cutting issue that faces both the 
transport sector and power sector. 
FIGURE 1. CAR OWNERSHIP, NEW ENERGY VEHICLES, AND PROPORTION OF NEW ENERGY VEHICLES IN THE TRANSPORTATION-
CATS 1.5°C SCENARIO.  
Large-scale deployment of new energy vehicles can be synergistic 
with the evolution of the power grid through coordinated development 
of EVs and the power grid. Electric vehicles can be used for "peak-
shaving", serving as a flexible load to help integrate variable renewable 
electricity on the grid. Large-scale, intelligent charging piles can 
promote the integration of electric vehicle charging systems and 
internal power distribution in buildings, promote car batteries to 
become a part of the building's flexible power consumption system, 
absorb the surplus power of residential buildings at night, peak shave 
and valley fill the power, and provide peak power consumption for 
office/residential buildings during daytime/peak power consumption 
periods.
As an example, the Transportation-CATS 1.5°C scenario estimates that 
the new energy vehicles will expand into urban public transportation, 
taxis, urban logistics and distribution vehicles, and electric trucks. 
Hydrogen fuel cell heavy-duty trucks in freight transportation will also 
increase. By 2025, new energy vehicle sales will account for 30% 
of total new car sales and will increase to almost all new car sales 
in 2050. 69 million electric vehicles in 2030 will provide a storage 
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capacity of 3.5 TWh and a flexible load of nearly 690 GW. 
These linkages highlight the need to coordinate development of an 
electrified transportation system and a low-carbon power sector. 
Important areas of coordination include: carrying out top-level design 
and policy mechanism research to support vehicle-to-grid systems, 
studying and formulating charge and discharge price policies that 
reflect the system values, so as to promote the connection between 
electric vehicles and renewable energy; guiding charging service 
providers to directly and deeply participate in the power market; 
carrying out R&D and demonstration of vehicle-to-grid and retired 
power battery energy storage technologies; and carrying out 
demonstrations of vehicle-to-grid projects to form a set of tested 
technical solutions, standard agreements, and market mechanisms.
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Near-Term Challenges, Opportunities, and Actions
Accelerate the adjustment of long-distance freight 
transport by supporting the use of railways and 
waterways.  The “Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State Council on Comprehensively 
Strengthening Ecological Environment Protection and 
Resolutely Fighting Pollution Prevention and Control”, 
the “Implementation Opinions of the Ministry of 
Transport on Comprehensively Strengthening Ecological 
Environment Protection and Resolutely Fighting 
Pollution Prevention and Control”, and other policy 
documents call for reducing road freight activity and 
increasing railway freight activity. China needs to 
increase the use of railway and water transport in long-
distance transportation of bulk materials, increase rail 
and port density of the network, and gradually reduce 
the proportion of heavy-duty diesel trucks for long-
distance transportation of bulk cargo.
Accelerate  the improvement  o f  green t rave l 
systems, focusing on "public transportation and 
cycling/walking". To promote emission reduction of 
transportation, it is necessary to give priority to public 
transportation planning, land use, capital, and road 
rights (Jiang et al., 2019); speed up the construction 
of bus rapid transit, bus lanes and rail transit, as well 
as slow-moving systems such as bicycle lanes and 
pedestrian lanes; develop mass transit systems; speed 
up the promotion of shared transportation modes such 
as network car, bike-sharing and car rental; constantly 
improve the sharing rate of bus trips; and finally, build 
urban travel systems that meet diversified needs. 
Promote and support the transition to new energy 
vehicles. With the rapid growth of China's new energy 
automobile industry, the sales and penetration of new 
energy vehicles will continue to rise. China needs to 
continue to accelerate the construction of charging 
facilities for new energy vehicles and promote a large-
scale transition to new energy vehicles (Li et al., 
2019). China can adopt a target to ban new sales of 
internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) powered by 
gasoline, except for heavy trucks. 
Vigorously develop intelligent transportation. Facilitate 
the research and development of applications such as 
the parallel technology of 5G communication technology 
and traditional highway communication links. Facilitate 
integration of 5G communication technology and 
vehicle-road collaboration systems (Yang et al., 2020). 
Through these means, pilot applications of vehicle-road 
collaboration could be achieved in some road sections 
by 2025. Through the promotion of the digitization of 
the full cycle of transportation infrastructure planning, 
design, construction, maintenance, operation, and 
management, large-scale and systematic big data sets 
and integrated transportation big data center systems of 
delivery vehicles and infrastructures can be established.
Significantly improve overall transportation energy 
efficiency. Encourage the elimination of old vehicles 
and vessels with high energy consumption and 
improve the technical level of energy conservation and 
environmental protection of transportation vehicles. 
With the technology progress in rail electrification, 
locomotive energy saving, and intelligent management, 
railway energy consumption could be reduced by 10%-
15% by 2025. In road transportation, upgrading of 
engine and vehicle manufacturing and the application 
BOX 4-19. TRANSPORTATION: NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO SUPPORT A LONG-TERM TRANSITION
  ► Accelerate the adjustment of long-distance freight transport by 
supporting the use of railways and waterways.
  ► Accelerate the improvement of green travel systems, focusing on 
"public transportation and cycling/walking".
  ► Improve the clean technology level, promoting the transition to 
new energy;
  ► Vigorously develop intelligent transportation.
  ► Significantly improve overall transportation energy efficiency.
  ► Strengthen the innovation in Transportation Demand Management 
policies.
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of technologies such as ecological driving could reduce 
road energy consumption by 15-20% by 2025 (Xie et 
al., 2018). Technologies such as the upsizing of ships 
and the standardization of ship types could increase the 
energy efficiency of waterway transport by 10%-20% 
by 2025 (Li et al., 2017). Refined flight management 
technology, aviation biofuel application technology, 
and new engine/aircraft research and development 
applications could increase the energy efficiency of air 
transport by 10%-30% by 2025 (Yu et al., 2020b).
Strengthen the innovation of Transportation Demand 
Management policies. Strengthen transportation 
demand management and make good use of economic 
policy levers such as green taxation and user payment 
to curb excessive growth and excessive use of private 
cars. Traffic demand management policies include, e.g., 
limited purchase restriction policies, differentiated 
parking charges, intelligent parking management, traffic 
congestion charges, and staggered commuting 
measures.
4.5 AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND OTHER LAND USE
Current Status and Trends
China, a country with almost 20% of the world’s 
population, has been struggling to feed its large 
population and considers food security to be a 
top priority in its national economic and social 
development. China’s 135 million hectares of arable 
land account for just 14% of the country’s total land 
area and about 7% of global arable land. China’s 
agronomic achievements since 1980 are unique and 
unprecedented in human history, maintaining self-
sufficiency in the supply of most major food crops 
and livestock products at more than 90% (Lal, 2018; 
Wilkes and Zhang, 2016). But this success has come 
with substantial environmental impacts (Lal, 2018). 
Although the Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU) sector presents a net sink of GHGs (Figure 
4-20), emissions from agricultural sources increased by 
about 37% from 1994 to 2014 (PRC Second Biennial 
Update Report on Climate Change, 2018; PRC First 
National Communication in 2004).
NEW TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE, ECONOMIC GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT, AND CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
As part of  i ts COVID-19 economic recovery efforts,  China’s 
transportation infrastructure investment is seen as a key channel not 
only to stimulate economic growth, but also to facilitate an economic 
transformation, increase employment, and upgrade consumption 
patterns. This new round of investment has been focused on 5G, inter-
city high-speed rail systems, urban rail transit, new energy vehicles, 
and charging stations. These investments are conducive to a low-
carbon transformation of transportation. It has been estimated that 
total investment in inter-city high-speed rail system and urban rail 
transit will reach a cumulative investment of 34,400 trillion yuan from 
2020-2025 (China Merchants Securities, 2020). This new investment 
will drive demand for upstream metal products. The Chinese central 
government has recently published a series of strategic planning and 
supporting policies to facilitate new transportation infrastructure 
investment, including the “Guidance on Promoting the Construction of 
New Transportation Infrastructure” issued by the Ministry of transport 
and the “Development Plan of New Energy Vehicle Industry” approved at 
the executive meeting of the State Council in August and October, 2020. 
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FIGURE 4-20. HISTORICAL COMPOSITION OF AFOLU (AGRICULTURE AND LULUCF) GHG EMISSIONS AND REMOVALS.
(Sources: PRC First and Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change in 2016 and 2018; PRC first, second and third National Communication in 2004, 2012 and 2018)
Food security will remain a top priority in China’s 
national socio-economic and agricultural strategies. 
Between 1978 and 2018, China’s population grew 
from 0.96 billion to 1.39 billion (NBS, 2019). 
Agricultural development is therefore essential for 
ensuring China’s long-term food security. The agriculture 
sector has been developing rapidly since reforms 
began in 1978. 2015 marked 12 consecutive annual 
increases of annual grain production in China, which 
reaching 620 million tonnes. According to the lower 
variant projection by the United Nations Division of 
Population, China’s population will level off at roughly 
1.45 billion in 2024 (Figure 4-21). In 2016, total food 
consumption was 360 kg capita-1 in China (Xin, 2018). 
As China’s per capita food demand continues to rise, 
peaking around 2030, total food demand will peak 
around 2030 as well. It is projected that 720 million 
tons of annual grain production will be needed by 
2030.  
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FIGURE 4-21. CHINA’S POPULATION PROJECTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS. 
(Source: UN-DESA, 2018)
At the same time, diets in China continue to shift. 
With urbanization, increasing of household income and 
improving living quality, diets in China will continue 
to shift to higher intake of high-value foods, such 
as dairy products, beef, sheep and goat meat, fruits 
and vegetables, and lower intake of starchy staples 
(Hamshere et al., 2014). The consumption of ruminant 
meat increased exponentially in China from early 
1990s, and dairy products from the early 2000s. 
China currently consumes around 50% of global pork 
and 23% of the global chicken, but only 14% and 7% 
of world ruminant meat and dairy products (Yu et al., 
2016; Xin, 2018; Du et al., 2018). Without actions to 
alter diets, it is projected that the per capita demand 
for grain (excluding feed grain), pork, ruminant meat, 
poultry meat, dairy products, and eggs in China will 
reach 100kg, 36kg, 17.8kg, 33kg, 22kg and 13 kg 
respectively by 2050 (Figure 4-22). This is expected 
to lead to an increase in national emissions from the 
agricultural sector, thereby making it more challenging 
for the country to decarbonize.
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FIGURE 4-22. PROJECTIONS OF CHINA’S PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION. 
 (Sources: Xin, 2018; Du et al., 2018)
Technology has played an important role in China’s 
agricultural sector evolution. From 2010 to 2015, 
application of advanced technologies has been 
responsible for 56% of agricultural development (Xu et 
al., 2017). Integrated mechanization farming methods, 
including land preparation, planting and harvesting, are 
not used in 63% of production processes.
Since 2010, China has embraced sustainable 
agriculture through a variety of national strategies. 
These strategies will alleviate the environmental 
impacts of rapid agricultural development. In 2015, 
China released the National Sustainable Agricultural 
Development Plan (2015-2030), two action plans to 
achieve zero growth in pesticides and fertilizers, and 
one action plan for cultivated land quality protection, 
to guide sustainable agriculture development in the 
coming decade, including the efficient utilization of 
resources (e.g. land, water, energy, etc.), recycling of 
agricultural wastes (e.g. manure, crop residues, etc.), 
trapping of carbon, and alleviation of environmental 
impacts. These strategies will create opportunities for 
reducing carbon emissions from the AFOLU sector.
China has a long and successful history of reforestation. 
China has endeavored to restore natural forest and re-
forest large areas of the country. With this aim in mind, 
a series of policies have been formulated (including 
annual harvest quotas, logging ban, etc.) and several 
key programs have been successfully implemented, 
including the Three-North Shelterbelt Program since 
1978; the Grain for Green Program since 1999; and 
the Natural Forest Conservation Program since 2000. 
From the time of the first national forest resource 
assessment, commonly known as National Forest 
Inventories (NFI’s), carried out in 1973-1976, to 
the latest 9th NFI, carried out in 2014-2018, these 
programs have successfully increased national forest 
cover from 121 million ha to 214 million ha (Zeng 
et al., 2015; Xu et al., 2019). At the same time, the 
forest growing stock volume has increased from 8.7 
billion m3 to 16.3 billion m3.
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Elements of Long-Term Strategy
Non-CO2 emiss ions f rom agr icul ture need to 
dramatically decline and AFOLU sectors need to 
be a net carbon sink to offset emissions. Long-term 
projection shows that under current conditions (i.e. 
a business-as-usual scenario), emissions from the 
agricultural sector will continue to increase until 2050. 
For example, a recently released report found that 
emissions will reach 1100 MtCO2-eq as compared 
to 830 MtCO2-eq in 2014 (He et al., 2020c). This 
trend of continued increases needs to be avoided to 
limit temperature change to 1.5°C.  In a 1.5°C (2.0°C) 
consistent pathway, emissions from the agricultural 
sector alone need to peak by 2030 and reach 628 
MtCO2-eq (929 MtCO2-eq for 2°C scenario) by 2030 
and 590 MtCO2-eq (872 MtCO2-eq for 2°C scenario) by 
2050 (He et al., 2020c). The AFOLU sector as a whole 
should keep its role of net carbon sink in the baseline, 
to enhance carbon storage in the terrestrial biosphere 
and soils. In a 1.5°C consistent pathway, the net carbon 
sink for AFOLU sector 1020 MtCO2-eq by 2050 (1030 
MtCO2-eq for 2°C scenario) (Figure 4-23).
BOX 4-21. AFOLU: KEY ELEMENTS OF A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR CARBON NEUTRALITY
  ► Non-CO2 emissions from agriculture need to dramatically 
decline and AFOLU sectors need to be a net carbon sink to offset 
emissions.
  ► Implement technical mitigation options (such as animal feed 
supplements, nitrification inhibitors or anaerobic digesters) 
and structural mitigation options (such as improved manure 
management, use of appropriate feed, crop and livestock 
production portfolio and shifts in international trade) within the 
Agricultural sector.
  ► Transition to a healthier and more sustainable diet with lower 
environmental impact.
  ► Sustain and enhance China’s forest carbon sink through continued 
afforestation and reforestation efforts. Increase the forest area 
by 35 Million hectares in 2050 relative to 2015 levels.
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FIGURE 4-23. PROJECTIONS OF TOTAL GHG EMISSIONS FOR THE AFOLU SECTOR IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Includes scenarios from GCAM-China, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, AGHG-INV, and PECE. The solid black line shows the historical emissions and removals. The error bars illustrate the uncertainty of 
emissions and removals in the GHG inventory data as provided in the official Chinese communications to UNFCCC (Sources: PRC First and Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change in 2016, 
2019). All projections have been harmonized to the GHG Inventory estimate for 2014, using a fixed harmonization factor that stays constant over time. 
Implement technical mitigation options (such as 
animal feed supplements, nitrification inhibitors 
or anaerobic digesters) and structural mitigation 
options (such as improved manure management, use 
of appropriate feed, crop and livestock production 
portfolio and shifts in international trade) within 
the Agricultural sector. Global and multi-model 
assessments have shown that the implementation 
of emission-reduction technologies and structural 
changes can provide significant emissions reductions 
in the Chinese Agriculture sector (Figure 4-24). The 
overall economic mitigation potential in the Chinese 
Agricultural sector has been estimated at 330 to 750 
MtCO2eq/yr by 2050 at US$125/tCO2eq. A majority of 
these emission reductions (30-94% of total emission 
reduction) would come from technical options such 
as animal feed supplements, nitrification inhibitors, 
or anaerobic digesters (Frank et al., 2016; Lin et 
al., 2019). Structural options can also provide large 
emissions reductions (17-49% of total emission 
reduction), mainly from shif ts in management 
systems, crop and livestock production portfolios, and 
international trade. The largest cost-effective reduction 
potential in the agricultural sector is related to livestock 
management, including improved manure management 
and enteric fermentation through improving livestock 
productivity, use of appropriate feed, and the conversion 
of manure to compost (Lin et al., 2019). Compared 
with other sectors, however, there are l imited 
technological measures or direct strategies for reducing 
non-CO2 GHG emissions from agriculture in China (Lin 
et al., 2019).
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FIGURE 4-24. PROJECTIONS OF N2O AND CH4 EMISSIONS FOR THE AFOLU SECTOR IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Includes scenarios from GCAM-China, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, AGHG-INV, and PECE. The solid black line shows the historical emissions. The error bars illustrate the uncertainty of emission inventory 
data as provided in the official Chinese communications to UNFCCC (Sources: PRC First and Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change in2016 and 2019). All projections have been harmonized 
to the GHG Inventory estimate for 2014, using a fixed harmonization factor that stays constant over time. 
Transition to a healthier and more sustainable diet 
with lower environmental impacts. A transition to a 
sustainable diet would be of great value for achieving 
deep decarbonization, as international assessments 
have shown that the mitigation potential associated 
with dietary changes is large within China, which is on 
the order of 10 to 60 MtCO2eq/yr by 2050 at US$125/
tCO2eq (Frank et al., 2016).
Sustain and enhance China’s forest carbon sink 
through continued efforts to afforest and re-forest 
the country. The Chinese LULUCF sector is a growing 
carbon sink, due largely to successful afforestation 
effor ts, str ingent protection of natural forests, 
enhancement of ecological systems, and adoption of 
strict ecological improvement measures. Given the 
key role that forest land plays in the Chinese LULUCF 
sector, securing and further enhancing the forest sink 
is key for safeguarding a low-carbon transition for the 
country. For example, in the 1.5°C (2°C) MESSAGEix-
GLOBIOM scenario, national forest area increases 
by 34 Million hectares (27 Million hectares), by 
2050 compared with 2015 levels. Afforestation and 
reforestation not only generate more carbon sinks, 
they also provide co-benefits related to many other 
ecosystem services, such as biodiversity and reduction 
of air and water pollutants. However, when planning 
these large-scale activities, it is important to properly 
assess the interlinkages between sectors and potential 
for the displacement of land-based activities. Land 
is inherently a finite resource. Extending the forest 
coverage may displace agricultural production and 
subsequently increase GHG emissions from other 
sectors.
A key uncertainty that would require further assessment 
is the potential for biomass production in China that 
could support bioenergy use to reduce CO2 emissions 
across the energy sector while safeguarding and 
enhancing the land use sink. To date, there have 
been notable variations in projections of bioenergy 
potential, depending mainly on assumptions about 
land availability and inclusion of biomass feedstocks 
(e.g. Bauer et al., 2018; Jiang et al., 2019; Qin et al., 
2018). It is essential to further assess the domestic 
potential across the full range of potential feedstocks, 
including forest residues, wood pellets, lignocellulosic 
crops, perennials, industrial by-products, agricultural 
residues, and to identify effective policies to mobilize 
these feedstocks while simultaneously avoiding 
potential negative impacts. Such an assessment can 
facilitate the discussions between scientific and policy 
communities.
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Near-Term Challenges, Opportunities, and Actions
China will Continue to embrace sustainable agriculture 
by promoting circular agriculture, recycling of waste 
reduction, and increased resource use efficiency. 
The National Plan for Sustainable Development 
of Agriculture (2015-2030) clearly recognized 
environmental concerns as an integral part of national 
agricultural development in the coming years. It 
provides the framework for policies and actions, and 
sets out targets for ecological and circular agriculture 
development, waste reduction and recycling, resource 
use efficiency, and pollution reduction.
It is necessary to encourage the integration of 
new technologies and innovation, such as climate 
smart agriculture and artificial intelligence, in the 
agricultural sector. Technology and innovation will 
play an increasingly important role in agricultural 
development. However, Chinese agriculture still has 
room to better incorporate the latest science and 
technology. Innovation remains at a relatively low level. 
With breakthroughs and diffusion of more advanced 
technologies, technical innovation could greatly improve 
resource efficiency and mitigate the environmental 
impacts of Chinese agriculture. In particular, innovation 
and new technologies need to improve upon key crop-
soil-water-nutrient balances, and policy innovations are 
required to encourage comprehensive integration of new 
technologies into farms across the country.
A crucial element of a short-term strategy is to 
continue to implement and enforce sustainable forest 
management to sustain and enhance the forest sink. 
The LULUCF is currently a net sink for China, but 
carbon neutrality in China will likely call for substantial 
carbon removals to offset residual fossil and non-
biogenic emissions that are either too difficult or too 
costly to abate by other means. However, scenarios 
include a high uncertainty in the development of the 
LULUCF sink. In the 1.5°C (2.0°C) scenarios explored 
in this study, the LULUCF sink ranges from a stable 
development to an enhancement of the sink by 560 
MtCO2-eq (520 MtCO2-eq) by 2050 compared to 2015 
levels (see Figure 4-25). The high uncertainty mainly 
relates to differences in the number and variety of 
mitigation options included in the different modeling 
frameworks. In general, the larger the set of mitigation 
options included in the model, the larger the reported 
LULUCF sink needs to be to limit warming. Because 
afforestation and reforestation can take decades to 
generate more removals, it is critical to plan today for 
the long-term transitions to an enhanced sink and to 
take action without delay.
BOX 4-22. AFOLU: NEAR-TERM ACTIONS TO SUPPORT A LONG-TERM TRANSITION
  ► Continue to embrace sustainable agriculture by promoting 
circular agriculture, recycling of waste reduction, and increased 
resource use efficiency.
  ► Encourage the integration of new technologies and innovation, 
such as climate smart agriculture and artificial intelligence, in the 
agricultural sector.
  ► Continue to implement and enforce sustainable forest 
management to sustain and enhance the forest sink.
  ► Implement actions that provide synergies and actively consider 
the links between agriculture, water, pollution, biodiversity, diets 
and GHG emissions.
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FIGURE 4-25. NET CO2 EMISSIONS FOR THE LULUCF SECTOR IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
Includes scenarios from GCAM-China, MESSAGEix-GLOBIOM, and PECE. . The solid black line shows historical net CO2 emissions. The error bars illustrate the uncertainty of emission inventory data as 
provided in the official Chinese communications to UNFCCC (Sources: PRC First and Second Biennial Update Report on Climate Change in2016 and2019; PRC National Communication, 2012). All 
projections have been harmonized to the GHG Inventory estimate for 2014, using a fixed harmonization factor that stays constant over time. 
The most promising mitigation measures to secure and 
enhance the LULUCF sink (e.g. reduced impact logging, 
close-to-nature management, improved plantations, 
changes in harvest intensity, optimization of thinning). 
Because forests play such a crucial role in retaining 
the LULUCF sink, forest management plays a key 
role in the future development of the LULUCF sink. 
This means that continued application of sustainable, 
ecological, tree-species and site-specific management 
practices remain key in ensuring the viability of the 
forest carbon sink (Zhou et al., 2013). Improvements in 
forest management offer large mitigation potential and 
are a cost-effective approach that can be implemented 
without changes in tenure in numerous cases (Griscom 
et al., 2017). Sustainable forest management practices 
aimed at providing timber and/or different ecosystem 
services can increase removals and contribute to 
climate change adaptation (IPCC, 2020).
This means that policy makers need to further 
implement, enforce, and potentially incentivize 
the application of sustainable and ecological forest 
management practices amongst various practitioners. 
Approaches for implementing these practices are 
numerous and include legislating the application of site-
specific management practices, enhanced enforcement 
where illegal practices occur, education of practitioners, 
implementation of forest certification schemes, and 
tightening control of biomass consumers. Many of these 
actions are also in synergy with actions that improve 
air quality and biodiversity, if handled in a manner 
appropriate for the local context.
Mitigation policies in the AFOLU sector should identify 
innovative ways of addressing challenges, including 
how to motivate the participation of millions of farmers 
and changes in their behavior. With 200–300 million 
−2000
−1500
−1000
−500
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Year
L
U
L
U
C
F
 C
O
2 
em
is
si
o
n
s 
( M
tC
O
2 
)
1.5°C
2°C
83 CHINA’S NEW GROWTH PATHWAY: FROM THE 14TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO CARBON NEUTRALITY
households, each of which farms a few hectares of 
land, the agricultural system relies heavily on high-to-
excessive inputs (Cui et al., 2018). In 2010, about 
70% of Chinese farms were less than 2 ha, while on 
average in the rest of the world, about 7% of farms 
are less than 2 ha (Wu et al., 2018). The choice of 
options also needs to account for impacts on yields and 
material inputs, and robust institutional arrangements 
(Lin et al., 2019). 
There are also substantial co-benefits for carbon 
mitigation from policies and technologies that raise 
water and nutrient efficiency or control the flow of 
pollution into water. It will be important to enhance 
actions that provide synergies and actively consider 
the links between agriculture, water, pollution, 
biodiversity, diets, and GHG emissions, for example, 
how to secure self-sufficiency of more than 90% of 
major food products.
BOX 4-23. FOOD SECURITY, WATER, BIODIVERSITY, AND CLIMATE MITIGATION
The benefits of reducing carbon emissions from the AFOLU sector 
extend well beyond climate mitigation. Many land-related mitigation 
options, such as nutrient management and waste management, have 
adaptation co-benefits, which can enhance the resilience of agriculture 
and help secure food supply (Fujimori et al., 2019). A transition to 
healthy and sustainable diets can also contribute to food security. 
However, mitigation policies in the AFOLU sector should be carefully 
designed so as to avoid significant yield losses. Afforestation or avoided 
deforestation can also reduce desertification and land degradation 
and enhance the provision of ecosystem services. But through the 
competition for land, it also poses risks for food security and could lead 
to food price increases (Kreidenweis et al., 2016). 
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5. THE ROLE OF 
THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR IN A LONG-
TERM STRATEGY
The financial sector is pivotal in China’s low-carbon transition. One critical issue 
in the near term is how to finance this transition. Specifically, what innovative 
financial tools and policy instruments are available to transform the market 
and scale up clean energy investment? Financial institutions and policy makers 
should also plan for the long term to avoid lock-in and stranded assets. The 
current financial and regulatory system needs to adapt and factor in possible 
physical and transition risks associated with climate change.
Meanwhile, the risk-return profile of financial institutions may change 
significantly. Their assets could be affected by clean energy policies, new 
technologies, and physical impacts of climate change, implying weaker growth 
and lower asset returns. Financial institutions and organizations in which they 
invest need to consider a transition strategy that diversifies their investment 
portfolios (Section 5.1) and manages potential risks (Section 5.2). Policy makers 
also need to act proactively, creating enabling conditions for this transition.
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5.1 FINANCING A LONG-
TERM TRANSITION
China is leading the expansion of clean energy 
investment around the world. Between 2010 and 
2019, nearly $2.7 trillion was invested globally in 
renewables (excluding large hydro), three to four times 
higher than the amount invested between the previous 
decades (UNEP and BNEF, 2020). China alone 
contributed to 30% of this growth and has remained 
the world’s top investor in renewable energy installation 
since 2013 (Figure 5-1).  
BOX 5-1. KEY APPROACHES TO SUPPORT INVESTMENT IN CHINA’S LOW-CARBON TRANSITION
  ► Regulatory actions that provide price certainty in environmental 
markets and discourage unsustainable practices can significantly 
stimulate demand for green products and services among banks.
  ► Fiscal policies need to be adjusted to drive systematic change 
and overcome institutional inertia, by diversifying sources of 
government revenues at national, provincial, and local levels 
to reduce carbon entanglement, aligning fiscal and budgetary 
incentives with ambitious climate targets, and harnessing the 
power of public procurement and spending towards low-carbon 
transitions.
  ► A diversified set of financial instruments are needed for long-
term transitions, including both established products and 
tools (e.g. bonds, grants, and loans) and innovative financial 
instruments (e.g. green bonds and green banks).
  ► Policy makers need to improve the financial system to support 
long-term transitions, such as enhancing greater market 
transparency and improving data disclosure, appropriately 
valuing risks in the financial system, and using fintech to create 
new opportunities for mobilizing private investment in climate 
finance.
  ► China’s low-carbon transition needs to mobilize a substantial 
amount of investment from institutional investors, such as 
pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, and 
mutual funds.
  ► Successful public-private partnership can allow limited public 
dollars to go further by leveraging private dollars, facilitate 
low-cost market growth, and enable job creation and economic 
development.
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FIGURE 5-1. TOP 20 MARKETS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY INVESTMENT BETWEEN 2010 AND 2019 (PANEL A) AND 
INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY IN 2019 (PANEL B). 
Investment estimates exclude investment in large hydro projects. Data are shown in billion 2019 U.S. dollars. The estimated values of investment in 2019 include estimates for undisclosed deals. 
China’s renewable investment dropped from $143 billion in 2017 to $83.4 billion in 2019.  (Source: UNEP and BNEF, 2020) 
With this investment, China has paved a path for a 
low carbon transition. While fossil energy investments 
continue to dwarf investments into renewable energy 
and energy efficiency globally, China’s clean energy 
investment has outweighed its fossil energy investment. 
In 2016, China’s investment in renewable energy 
and energy efficiency was $167 billion, accounting 
for 55% of its total energy investment (the share of 
fossil investment was 34%), whereas clean energy 
investment represented only 33% of total energy 
investment globally (the share of fossil investment was 
50%) (IEA, 2018).  
However, a low-carbon transition in line with the 
new growth pathway requires further scaling up the 
clean energy investment, posing significant financial 
opportunities and challenges in both the near and long 
term. Globally, to meet the current national climate 
pledges under the Paris Agreement, McCollum et al. 
(2018) estimated that an extra $130 billion per year 
needs to be invested in energy efficiency and clean 
energy in the next decade; this increases to $460 
billion per year in order to limit global temperature rise 
to 1.5°C, generating new investment opportunities. 
Similarly, China needs a rapid upscaling and structural 
change of investments in energy infrastructure. Zhou 
et al. (2019) estimated that annual energy investment 
would increase to $540 billion to limit warming to 
1.5°C ($420 billion for 2°C), compared to $340 billion 
in current policies/NDC scenarios. Meanwhile, to reach 
1.5/2°C goals, the share of low-carbon investment in 
total energy investment will increase significantly. By 
2035 annual low-carbon investment in China would 
need to grow by 40% (2°C) and 110% (1.5°C) from 
2015 levels ($160 billion), reaching $220 billion (2°C) 
and $330 billion (1.5°C); it would need to grow $280 
billion (2°C) and $420 billion (1.5°C) by 2050 (Figure 
5-2). Rapid electrification and a low-carbon transition 
will require large investments in the electricity system 
that focus on renewable energy and generation with 
CCUS, transmission and distribution networks, and 
large-scale storage. Investments in energy efficiency will 
also increase rapidly, as there are significant low-cost 
opportunities to reduce emissions through efficiency 
improvements in buildings and industry (see Box 5-2).
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FIGURE 5-2. CHINA’S ANNUAL ENERGY INVESTMENT BY CATEGORY IN 1.5°C AND 2°C SCENARIOS. 
(Source: Zhou et al., 2019) 
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 BOX 5-2. INVESTMENT NEEDS OF DIFFERENT SECTORS IN CHINA’S LOW-CARBON TRANSITION
Power sector
  ► Ramping up investment in renewable generation
  ► Ramping up investment in storage technologies
  ► Expanding and modernizing grid infrastructure and transmission 
systems
  ► Establishing dedicated funds to support a coal phase-out and just 
transition
  ► Increasing investment in other clean energy technologies (e.g. 
large scale hydro, CCUS, nuclear)
Non-Electric Transformation 
  ► Spurring investment in hydrogen R&D, new applications, and clean 
hydrogen supply and infrastructure
  ► Increasing investment in advanced biofuels
Buildings
  ► Expanding investment in building energy efficiency
  ► Accelerating investment in smart technologies and renewable 
energy integration
Industry
  ► Expanding investment in industrial energy efficiency
  ► Upgrading industrial technologies/facilities (e.g. hydrogen, CCUS)
  ► Building a modernized industrial sector through innovative 
manufacturing and organization modes
Transportation
  ► Increasing investment in EV and other novel transportation 
technologies
  ► Investing in transport infrastructure to facilitate mode changes 
and integration of EVs and smart technologies 
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Investment decisions made today will directly 
impact transition pathways and costs in the future. 
The next five years are a critical window, as policy 
and investment decisions made now can shape the 
development trajectories in the next few decades. 
Investment in clean energy infrastructure needs to be 
scaled up substantially in the coming years to support a 
broader development and economic transition in China.
However, a number of barriers could obstruct this 
clean energy investment. These barriers include high 
upfront costs for customers, real and perceived investor 
risks, unrealistic financing terms that erode project 
economics, institutional and policy barriers, information 
asymmetries for both customers and investors, and 
inadequacy of traditional government subsidy programs 
to drive real market growth. 
Changes in both policies and financial instruments 
are needed to overcome these barriers, and this is 
especially critical for underserved market segments, 
such as building energy efficiency and less mature 
technologies (e.g. CCUS, hydrogen). To overcome these 
barriers, we are offering the following key approaches 
for China to seize the opportunities to scale up 
investments and fulfill its low-carbon transition. 
Regulatory actions that provide price certainty in 
environmental markets and discourage unsustainable 
practices can significantly stimulate demand for 
green products and services among banks. Moreover, 
coherent, long-term policy goals can de-risk deployment 
of clean energy technologies and mobilize more private 
capital to clean energy investment. Near- and long-
term energy policies discussed in Section 4, if well 
implemented, can facilitate the growth of clean energy 
investment. 
Fiscal policies need to be adjusted to ensure fiscal 
sustainability for a low-carbon future. Efforts are 
needed to make systematic change. This will include 
actions to diversify government revenue streams at 
national, provincial, and local levels to reduce carbon 
entanglement, design fiscal and budgetary incentives 
towards the carbon neutrality goal, and use public 
procurement and spending to drive markets towards 
low-carbon transitions (OECD et al., 2018). Public 
finance is critical in terms of creating market signals 
towards clean energy technologies, especially early-
stage technologies that are promising but have higher 
risks (e.g. CCUS and hydrogen) (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2018). 
Engaging private sector capital is critical to this 
transition. Financial and energy policy makers need to 
identify ways to engage the private sector in financing 
and developing clean energy infrastructure. This 
requires the creation of enabling conditions and policy 
frameworks, in particular, changes in the financial 
system. Enhancing greater market transparency and 
improving data on performance, risks, costs, and 
investment opportunities are essential to promote clean 
energy investment as an asset class and leverage more 
private sector investment. For example, China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released a timetable 
for introducing mandatory Environmental, Social, and 
Corporate Governance (ESG) disclosure for all listed 
companies as early as 2020, but there is still a long 
way to go. Appropriately estimating risks in the financial 
system by broadening risk concepts and time horizons 
can help investors plan for risks and opportunities 
associated with low-carbon transitions (see Section 
5.2 for a discussion on risks). Digitalization also brings 
new opportunities for mobilizing private investment in 
climate finance (see Box 5-3). The Chinese government 
is actively engaging in international activities (e.g. Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) 
and Network for Greening the Financial System) to reset 
the financial system in line with long-term transitions in 
China and globally. 
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China’s low-carbon transition can succeed by mobilizing 
significant new investments from the private sector, 
especially institutional investors, such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, 
and mutual funds (EaP Green, 2017). While attitudes 
in this community have been changing rapidly, some 
institutional investors have not yet developed a strong 
appetite for clean energy investment due to lack of 
awareness and/or capacity. Regulators can continue to 
encourage these investors and other stakeholders to 
develop ESG products, report via ESG disclosure, and 
educate investors (Ma et al., 2020).
Established products and tools or innovative financial 
instruments can finance China’s low-carbon transition. 
Established financing mechanisms, such as bonds, 
grants, and loans, can leverage proven pathways for 
infrastructure investment by adding environmental 
value. China launched the green bond market in 
2016 and has issued 184 green bonds ($74 billion) 
since then, primarily covering air pollution control, 
transportation, and renewable energy. Meanwhile, green 
bonds only account for a small share (~2%) of total 
bond issuance in China and have great potential for 
growth. It is estimated that green bonds would need to 
make up 20% of total bond issuance in China to meet 
the market need for clean energy investment. To achieve 
this growth, several actions need to be taken to lower 
risks and reduce uncertainties, such as harmonization 
of taxonomy, improvement in standardization and 
information disclosure, engagement of institutional 
investors, and expansion to underserved markets such 
as green buildings (Ma et al. 2019). 
Innovative financing mechanisms also need to be 
developed to accelerate clean energy investment. Green 
investment banks or clean energy finance authorities, 
for example, have been gaining growing interests 
globally in financing low-carbon transitions. A green 
investment bank is a public or quasi-public financial 
institution that provides financing options and market 
development tools in partnership with the private sector 
to encourage and hasten adoption of clean energy 
technologies, energy efficiency, or other low-carbon, 
climate-resilient infrastructure. It is an effective public-
private partnership that helps address market barriers, 
facilitate low-cost market growth, enable job creation 
and economic development, and allow public dollars to 
go further (see Box 5-4). 
BOX 5-3. DIGITALIZATION AND GREEN FINANCE: FINTECH PROMOTES LOW-CARBON DEVELOPMENT
Fintech has the potential to make it easier for private capital to invest 
in clean energy projects and scale up green finance in China. First, it 
facilitates the standardization and better management of contracts, 
which in turn reduces costs and facilitates the assessment and tracking 
of projects. Second, it strengthens the availability, transparency, and 
reliability of data, which could result in advanced analysis and better 
management of investment risks. Third, it disperses finance broadly 
and allows a wide range of investors to invest directly in low-carbon 
projects. 
People’s Bank of China (PBoC), for example, developed a Green Finance 
Information Management System (GFIMS) that collects and analyzes 
green finance flows across jurisdictions and allows for the central-
level PBoC to standardize and develop strategic decisions for future 
green finance development. The GFIMS is an information management 
platform for green lending data.  Enabled by big data, artificial 
intelligence, cloud computing, and other technologies, it functions as a 
repository for green lending data, statistics and analytics, regulations, 
and policy implementation strategies. PBoC is currently carrying out 
a pilot program in Huzhou. In the long term, the system can inform 
the development of the national green finance system, help financial 
regulators manage green finance information in real time, and provide 
data to support macro policymaking.
Sources: OECD et al., 2018; Paulson Institute, 2020.
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5.2 RISKS TO THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR
The financial sector will be increasingly exposed 
to and impacted by the physical risks from climate 
change. Damages caused by more frequent and severe 
extreme events and long-term temperature change and 
sea level rise could reduce asset values and increase 
insurance payments, imposing both acute and chronic 
risks to the banking and insurance industries. In 2017, 
the overall losses caused by natural disasters amounted 
to roughly $340 billion, and insurers had to pay out a 
record $138 billion to cover the insured (Munich RE, 
2018). This number was $52 billion in 2019 (Munich 
RE, 2020). To maintain financial stability, it is crucial 
for the financial sector to take into account the risks of 
climate change. 
While mitigating the physical risks from climate 
change, low-carbon transition may also bring risks 
to the financial sector if they are not prepared for in 
advance or properly managed. China’s low-carbon 
transition will entail extensive policy, regulatory, 
technology, and market changes to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change. These changes can pose different 
levels of market and reputational risks to banks, 
insurance companies, and asset owners. Transition risks 
are different across sectors, asset types, geographical 
regions, and time frames. A large-scale coal phase out 
in China (and Chinese investments overseas) could 
pose challenges to the financial system from extensive 
stranded assets and devaluation of the companies 
owning them, and these impacts are expected to be 
greater in certain regions.
The transition to a greener economy can also bring 
opportunities to the Chinese financial sector (see 
Figure 5-3). For example, there is growing evidence 
that organizations have successfully reduced operating 
costs by improving efficiency in production and 
distribution processes. Investment in new energy 
sources and technologies (e.g. wind, solar, CCUS, 
storage) brings new opportunities to the financial sector. 
Financial institutions can proactively seek opportunities 
in new markets or asset types to diversify their 
investment portfolio and prepare for the low-carbon 
transition. For example, Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan 
Chase recently announced restrictions on financing 
fossil fuel infrastructure. New opportunities can also be 
BOX 5-4. GREEN INVESTMENT BANKS: INNOVATIVE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO FINANCE CLIMATE SOLUTIONS
 A green investment bank, also known as a clean energy finance 
corporation or clean energy finance authority, is a public or quasi-
public financial institution that leverages private capital to invest in 
low-carbon transitions and accelerate the growth of clean energy 
markets. Green banks usually include a mandate to mobilize private 
investment using public funds by intervening in the market to mitigate 
risks and enable transactions. Green banks in the U.S., for example, 
on average have the leverage ratio of 1:8 (for every $1 of public funds 
committed, private capital is attracted into the market for a total 
investment in green projects of $8), and this ratio can be as high as 1:20.  
There are more than 16 green banks globally, from country to city 
level.  Green banks can be capitalized with a variety of funding 
sources, including government appropriations and programs (such as 
repurposing funds from existing programs), utility funds (ratepayer 
funds, surcharges, etc.), revenues from carbon taxes and emissions 
trading schemes, and bond issuance. Once in operation, green banks 
take part in multiple activities including taking financing techniques 
such as credit support, co-investment, and securitization; offering 
financing products such as loans, leases, and credit enhancements; 
conducting market development such as technical assistance, turn-key 
product design and delivery, and access to information; and collecting, 
analyzing, and reporting data.
A bill for creating a national U.S. Green Bank (USGB) was introduced in 
the Congress in 2019, with the purpose of financing climate solutions at 
scale and bringing clean energy investment to underserved markets. If 
enacted as is, the USGB would deploy up to $35 billion in capital through 
the network of state and local green banks and is expected to mobilize 
$1 trillion towards climate actions. It would accelerate low-carbon 
transitions by directly investing in communities affected by fossil fuel 
phaseout and financing clean energy projects. 
Source: Frech et al., 2020. 
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captured by underwriting or financing green bonds and 
infrastructure (e.g. low-carbon energy production, grid 
connectivity, or transport networks).
FIGURE 5-3. CLIMATE RELATED RISKS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND FINANCIAL IMPACTS. 
(Source: TCFD, 2017)
FIGURE 5-4. TRANSITION RISK STRESS TEST. 
(Source: NGFS, 2020)
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Financial institutions will need to take actions to 
facilitate the low-carbon transition and address 
physical and transition risks. To manage potential 
physical and transition risks, financial institutions need 
to: first, assess current investment portfolios exposed 
to these risks and explore opportunities to mitigate 
and diversify them; second, analyze potential financial 
impacts at the asset level, and evaluate options to 
improve resilience; and third, incorporate impacts of 
physical and transition risks into financial models and 
quantify returns, investment options, and exit strategy.  
FIGURE 5-5. ROLES OF DIFFERENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANAGING RISKS. 
(Source: CFLI, 2019)
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The Chinese central bank and other f inancial 
regulators are taking into account climate-related 
financial risks and undertaking policy designs and 
actions to echo the high-quality growth goal. China 
wants to take more leadership in international financial 
market rule setting and has made a good start. The 
PBoC attached great importance to climate-related 
risks and their links to macroeconomic stability. 
Deputy Minister of PBoC, Chen Yulu, has emphasized 
the potential risks that climate change will pose to 
financial stability on many occasions and has indicated 
that PBoC is incorporating climate risks into macro 
prudential assessment (MPA) and is investigating how 
the macroeconomy and the financial sector interact 
in response to the transition risks. Meanwhile, in the 
beginning of 2020, the China Banking and Insurance 
Regulatory Commission issued the Guideline on High-
quality Development of Banking, Insurance sectors, 
and called for China’s banks and other financial 
institutions to establish and improve the environmental 
and social risk management systems and enhance 
institutional capacity by setting up green finance 
departments to facilitate green lending and manage 
potential environmental and social risks. The goal of 
these actions is to ensure the high-quality development 
of the banking and insurance industries in response 
to China’s economic downturn due to COVID-19, but, 
importantly, environmental and climate risk elements 
have become a priority in the credit granting process.
In May 2020, the PBoC, NDRC, and CSRC jointly 
released a draft guidance document that, for the first 
time, excludes “clean coal” and other fossil energy 
projects from being funded by green bonds. Delisted 
projects include ultra-low emissions retrofitting of coal-
fired power plants, cleaner production and utilization of 
coal, retrofit and operation of flexible coal-fired power 
generation for peak shaving, facilities for unconventional 
oil and gas exploration and production, use of coalbed 
methane, and more. This is an important policy 
breakthrough that signals renewed momentum for 
further constraining coal growth in China.
UK-China pilot on climate and environmental risk 
disclosure has made progress on the financial risk 
assessment for different financial institutions. This 
pilot will continue to expand and bring in more players. 
So far, the UK-China pilot has made several important 
breakthroughs. First, the pilot was expanded to include 
all financial sectors. The number of pilot participants 
increased from 10 to 13, covering all financial sectors, 
including banking, asset management and insurance. 
On the UK side, the government’s Green Finance 
Initiative made an announcement requiring all listed 
companies and major asset management companies in 
the UK to disclose under the TCFD framework before 
2022. 
Second, the Chinese and UK participants disclosed 
climate and environmental information in accordance 
with TCFD recommendations and the Climate and 
Environmental Information Disclosure Framework 
developed in light of China’s actual conditions. 2019 
was the first phase of the Action Plan, and most 
of the Chinese participating institutions disclosed 
environmental information in separate disclosure 
reports. 
Third, the pilot has been gradually increasing in 
influence. For example, Huzhou National Green Finance 
Reform Pilot Zone made overall disclosures with 
reference to the UK-China pilot framework. Moreover, 
financial institutions including ICBC, Industrial Bank, 
and China Emissions Exchange (CEEX), in accordance 
with the requirements of the PBoC, formed a task force 
of standards formulation that published the Guidelines 
for Financial Institution Environmental Information 
Disclosure on the basis of the pilot practices and 
results. Last, but not least, the pilot participants 
have taken part in international standard-setting and 
discussion.
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FIGURE 5-6. 2019 PROGRESS REPORT OF UK-CHINA CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE PILOT.
(Source: UK-China Climate and Environmental Information Disclosure Pilot 2019 Progress Report, 2019) 
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6. CONCLUSIONS
China is poised today to accelerate its movement on a new growth pathway 
toward a clean, vibrant economy that provides broadly shared benefits across 
China—and in doing so, it can also lead internationally on delivering solutions 
and making a major contribution to address global climate change. China’s 
carbon neutrality goal makes clear the ultimate destination for the new 
growth pathway, and China’s vision for an ecological civilization and its broad 
development objectives provide additional guideposts for how to reach this goal. 
In every sector across the Chinese economy, key long-term strategies can be 
linked to near-term actions that can put China on a course to lower emissions 
and green development. The research and analysis presented in this report 
demonstrates that the process of moving toward carbon neutrality can also 
provide a comprehensive basis for the significant economic transformation to 
reach broader national goals. Moreover, significant steps have already been 
taken to start moving toward this new growth pathway.
Nevertheless, the goal remains challenging. It will require significant planning, 
analysis, and policy actions to set the course and build the new economy 
to achieve the vision. The actions that China takes today will be critical to 
successfully implement this strategy. Opportunities for accelerating this transition 
exist across all sectors of the economy and industrial sectors.
While the overall scope of activity and next steps across the economy are 
relatively clear, additional discussions and analysis will be needed to refine our 
understanding of long-term pathways and near-term actions and to develop 
policy approaches that balance diverse needs. Broadly, additional areas for 
development include:
  ► Shared vision for a New Growth Pathway. China’s new growth pathway, 
rooted in its pledge to reach carbon neutrality before 2060, will be 
most successful if benefits to China’s development objectives are well 
understood and shared across the country and the economy. New insight 
will be needed to understand how this can be best achieved.
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  ► Industrial transitions. China’s industrial transition 
on a new growth pathway and associated efforts 
to reduce industrial emissions will take place in 
the context of industrial modernization, China’s 
overall economic strategy, and an evolving role in 
international markets. New insights and scenarios 
are needed to understand possible pathways and 
strategies.
  ► Full economy coal phaseout. New opportunities 
exist to achieve a structured phase-out of coal-
fired electricity; and a full phase will require 
eliminating coal in other sectors, such as industry, 
and addressing just transitions across the full coal 
supply chain. A fuller picture of these transitions 
both nationally and regionally is needed.
  ► Sustainable finance. Mobilizing finance will be 
critical for green growth and will depend on the 
development of energy, fiscal and monetary, and 
financial policies. A deeper understanding of 
frameworks to comprehensively address these 
needs and address the risks inherent in climate 
finance is needed.
  ► Technology and technology transitions. Successful 
technology development and deployment is at the 
heart of climate mitigation; many technologies 
are already changing the emissions and economic 
landscape, while others are on the horizon and hold 
great promise. Greater understanding is needed of 
which technologies will be most important and the 
key development, deployment, and management 
needs to support their use at scale.
  ► Non-CO2 gases. Multiple opportunities exist to 
reduce China’s overall emissions from GHGs other 
than CO2, including methane, nitrous oxide, and 
HFCs. But these opportunities are not yet well 
understood in many industrial and energy sectors.
  ► Province-level strategy and actions. Cutting across 
all of these dimensions is the need to understand 
opportunities, strategies, and actions in the 
provinces. As China continues to build policies 
that help it transition toward a green economy, 
the provinces will be a critical link to implement 
them. Helping provinces understand their own 
opportunities will be an important component of an 
overall national strategy.
China’s path forward is clear. While there are 
undoubtedly challenges, building a strategy on the 
new growth pathway will help achieve goals not 
only for the overall economy, health, clean air, and 
broader prosperity, but will also transform the economy 
toward decarbonization in line with China’s goals. The 
outcomes of this pathway will provide benefits to China 
and demonstrate China’s leadership in setting the world 
on a global pathway to successfully address climate 
change.
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